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FIVE DEGREES OF SEPARATION: A
RESPONSE TO JUDGE SHELDON'S THE
SLEEPWALKER'S TOUR OF DIVORCE
LAW
Laurie C. Kadoch*
"[B]y our doing and our ways of knowing we make ourselves
what we are."'
I. INTRODUCrioN
In a recent edition of this Law Review, Judge John C. Sheldon
blames both Maine's highest court and its Legislature for causing a
somnambular development of divorce law.' Judge Sheldon's article
is premised on two beliefs: that marriage and the nuclear family are
dead or dying ideals that should not be revived, and that law should
be formed to comport with the current behavior of people.3 Based
on these beliefs, Judge Sheldon proposes a radical change in Maine
divorce law: the abolishment of the need for court involvement of
any kind in uncontested divorces by the elimination of required ifl-
ings and hearings in all uncontested cases.' In support of his pro-
posals, Judge Sheldon suggests that court involvement in
uncontested divorces is a meaningless waste of judicial time.5 He
further suggests that courts, rather than legislatures, are the appro-
priate vehicles for effecting needed change in family law.6 Judge
Sheldon lays blame for the problems facing the development of fam-
ily law on antiquated, traditional notions of marriage and family.'
* Assistant Professor of Legal Writing, Vermont Law School; Visiting Professor,
Roger Williams Law School, 1995-1997; B.A., Boston University, 1970; M.A.,
University of Southern Maine, 1988; J.D., University of Maine School of Law, 1988.
The Author was formerly an associate with Verrill & Dana in Portland, Maine,
where she specialized in family law.
I am indebted to Roger Williams Law School for its support and especially to my
research assistant, Bridgette McMaster, for her excellent research assistance and to
Karen Sherman, whose good spirit and ability to read my handwriting were
invaluable. I also thank David Kadoch who thoughtfully listened to my ideas
throughout the formation of this Article.
1. MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AmD DIVORCE IN WEsTERN LAW 140 (1987)
(paraphrasing an Aristotelian insight).
2. John C. Sheldon, The Sleepwalker's Tour of Divorce Law, 48 ME. L. REv. 7
(1996). Sheldon is a Maine District Court Judge.
3. See id. at 25, 48.
4. See id. at 9, 16.
5. See id. at 13.
6. See id at 48.
7. See id. at 9, 44.
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His thesis is that "fear of change"' is at the root of the problems
with divorce law today and that courts simply use "circular reason-
ing" to continue to sustain antiquated and empty rules.'
At the time I came across Judge Sheldon's article, I was doing
research for an article about divorce settlement agreements in which
I was contemplating the changing legal landscape of family law, and
the causes and negative effects of a growing trend toward privatiza-
tion on the development of family law.10 Judge Sheldon's article
epitomized for me the advocacy position in favor of the privatization
of divorce law with absolutely no consideration or analysis of the
long-range and broad effects of such a proposal on individuals, fami-
lies, society, or the forming of substantive family law.
Judge Sheldon's ideas and proposals concerning Maine's divorce
law invited a dialogue for the contemplation of the changing legal
landscape of family law that I could not resist. I have long held the
opinion that Maine is one of the last bastions in which people care-
fully consider change-this is particularly true in realms of industry
and commerce, but the approach carries over into other areas of
societal decision-making as well. It is not that people from Maine
are afraid of change; in fact, they tend to be quite progressive. It is
rather that they are cautious about change, weighing carefully the
long-range and broader effects before jumping too quickly onto the
bandwagon. This outlook made a strong impression upon me dur-
ing my formative years and may explain, even though I am now
"from away,' 1 my need to respond to Judge Sheldon's proposed
changes and to promulgate my own approach. I borrow my ap-
proach from Oliver Wendell Holmes, who suggested that in order to
understand the law we must ask about "the ends which the several
rules seek to accomplish, the reasons why those ends are desired,
what is given up to gain them, and whether they are worth the
8. Id. at 43.
9. See idU at 9-10.
10. I have been immersed for some time in the research and contemplation of the
current phenomenon in the law where emphasis is on process rather than substance.
I have been concerned with the effects of this trend on substantive family law. I
agree with Mary Ann Glendon that "[t]he present legal ordering of the family is
composed of the accumulated accidents and inventions of the past" and that "[w]e
are now in the process of adding a layer that will reflect the circumstances of our
own time and whatever intelligence we are able to bring to bear." GLZM ON, supra
note 1, at 141. By emphasis on process I refer to the rapid changes in the process of
divorce that focus on a privatized contractual model progressively more separated
from legal process and substantive family law. My fear is that with process setting
the course, little or no thought is going into where we are headed, and when we next
pause to look back, we may find unanticipated and unwelcome results.
11. Actually, this is Maine idiom for anyone not born in Maine. I use it here to
signify that I now live outside of Maine.
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price."' 2 In his article, Judge Sheldon cavalierly announces that the
"ends" of current divorce laws are untenable and the "reasons" for
these "ends" are anachronistic. He proposes dramatic changes with-
out consideration of the "costs" that these changes might produce.
My thesis is that the forming of family law, which is currently be-
ing driven by a focus on process rather than substance, should in-
stead be substantively driven by carefully considered answers to
Holmes's questions. The process-driven development of divorce law
is manifest in the push for privatization of domestic relations law, as
evidenced by Judge Sheldon's proposed changes. Furthermore, un-
derlying my general thesis is the sub-thesis that isolated and discon-
nected segments of society are failing to communicate and reach a
consensus about the substantive values family law should embody,
and that it is this failure to communicate and not "fear of change"
that is creating the somnambular development of divorce law. I
view these unconnected segments of society as five degrees of sepa-
ration: individual from individual, individual from community, com-
munity from legislature, legislature from the courts, and law from
other disciplines. 3
In this Article, I suggest that Judge Sheldon's analysis of divorce
law, as well as his proposals for change, are endemic of the real root
of the problem facing the development of family law in the United
States today-a failure to address Holmes's questions before em-
bracing the process-driven privatization of domestic relations law.
Furthermore, I suggest that Judge Sheldon's proposed changes for
Maine divorce law exacerbate each of the five degrees of separation
creating further impediments to the meaningful communication nec-
essary for consensus building.
Part II of the Article examines Judge Sheldon's proposed changes
to Maine divorce law-the abolition of filings and hearings in un-
contested divorce cases and his pronouncement that it is "fear of
change" that perpetuates what he considers meaningless and waste-
ful use of the legal system. 4 I suggest that in the advocacy of his
privatized model of divorce, Judge Sheldon fails to consider ade-
quately the critical questions raised by Holmes. By rapidly dis-
missing hearings in uncontested cases on the grounds that they are
not required by statute, rule, or common sense, Judge Sheldon over-
looks both statutory law and case law that suggest otherwise. Fur-
thermore, he fails to consider a number of common-sense reasons
for the rules. Finally, Judge Sheldon fails to consider the costs of
abolishing filings and hearings in uncontested divorces.
12. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 476
(1897).
13. The law has become insulated from other disciplines such as sociology, an-
thropology, psychology, and history.
14. See Sheldon, supra note 2, at 43.
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Court review of uncontested cases is expected under Maine law,
and hearings for the purpose of meaningful court review do serve
important and necessary needs, both ritualistic and substantive.
This section examines the importance of ritual and symbol embod-
ied in the rules of divorce, as well as the substantive necessity for
those rules, especially the prophylactic effect of early court interven-
tion in the divorce process. By its nature, this process involves va-
ried and complex legal issues that, if not properly addressed at the
time of divorce, may exacerbate post-divorce disputes.
We must consider the costs society will pay if, in the absence of a
public consensus on the path family law should follow, we allow the
private ordering of divorce arrangements to drive the development
of the law. A privatized model of divorce will further impede soci-
ety's contemplation of Holmes's questions by exacerbating the five
degrees of separation. Privatized divorce individualizes issues of di-
vorce, separating individual from individual and individual from
community. It impedes a normative review and monitoring of pat-
terns of divorce and its effects on parties, particularly women and
children. The elimination of normative regulation and review hin-
ders response to, and reform of, the rules of divorce. A reformation
of the current uncontested hearing process is needed in order to cre-
ate and sustain "ends" that are more substantive and responsive
than mere efficiency of process.
Part III addresses Judge Sheldon's criticism of the court and Leg-
islature's lawmaking and his belief that Maine's alimony statute is
useless and "vacuous.""5 Judge Sheldon believes that Maine's ali-
mony statute, like the rules regulating uncontested divorce, is anach-
ronistic and untenable.16 He states that "need" is a pivotal criterion
for alimony in Maine case law and statute. 7 He then dismisses need
as a proper purpose for alimony and thereby arrives at the conclu-
sion that the statute is useless.18
I suggest that the statute,' 9 which was dramatically revised in
1989, provides a useful tool, as well as a societal directive, for the
court to fashion responsive divorce resolutions in which the individ-
ual aspects of a couple's marriage and current economic situation
can be taken into account to fashion a just result. In this way, the
statute embodies a broader purpose for alimony than need-to fash-
ion a just result when the parties' current economic situation, as in-
dicated by income and/or property, would otherwise cause an unjust
resolution. I discuss the usefulness of the statute's "ends" in this
regard and conclude that any problems with the alimony statute are
15. See id. at 44.
16. See id at 9.
17. See id. at 29.
18. See i
19. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 721 (West Supp. 1996-1997).
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not the result of empty legislation but rather of improper applica-
tion. A narrative example20 illustrates improper application and
demonstrates that an expanded legislative mandate for judicial ad-
herence to statutes at the trial level and more meaningful review at
the appellate level are necessary to ensure that the statute's ends are
achieved.
Part IV of this Article examines the framework of Judge Shel-
don's article, which is based on his reading of Arthur Koestler's
book, The Sleepwalkers: A History of Man's Changing Vision of the
Universe.21 Judge Sheldon misses the real usefulness of Koestler's
book as an analogous view of the development of divorce law, and
instead separates the narrow ideas of "fear of change" and "circular
reasoning" from the broader thesis of Koestler's story. Koestler's
broader historical vision of the development of cosmology-which
integrates past, present, and future-is more analogous to Holmes's
suggested framework for understanding the law.
Fmally, I suggest that Koestler is concerned with my sub-thesis:
the effects of separations in society on our ability to answer the
kinds of questions posed by Holmes. Koestler believes that the
problems facing society have been caused by separations-in the
case of his story, separations between scientific views of the world
and the more esoteric religious and moral views-and that the key
to resolution of these problems lies with a reintegration of man's
schizophrenic view of the world.' Only a co-joining of our separate
and distinct disciplines or bodies of knowledge will provide us with
the reconciled view of the world' needed to determine our broad
goals and to be sure that what we give up in the process is worth the
price. Koestler warns of the dangers of an "ends-justifies-the
means" approach to existence and advocates for a broader lens view
of science, spirituality, art, and human knowledge in general to de-
termine how we move forward from our "present predicament. 24
20. See, e.g., Carol Weisbrod, Divorce Stories: Readings, Comments and Ques-
tions on Law and Narrative, 1991 BYU L. REv. 143 (1991) (discussing the growing
importance of narrative in family law scholarship).
21. ARTHUR KOESTLER, T E SLEEPwALKERs: A HISTORY OF MAN'S CHANGING
VISION OF THE UNIVERSE (MacMillan Co. 1968) (1959). In researching this Article,
the Author used a different publication of Koestler's book than Judge Sheldon did in
writing his article.
22. See id. at 517, 541-42.
23. See id. at 14 & 547 n.2, 15, 50, 514, 518, 541-42 (citing ARTHUR KOESTLER,
INSIGHT AND OUTLOOK, AN INQUIRY INTO THE COMMON FOUNDATIONS OF SCI-
ENCE, ART AND SociAL ETHIcs (1949)). Koestler understands that the science of a
given time is a reflection of a world view and that by studying science, we are in fact
studying the evolution of thought. One of the main topics of Koestler's book is the
crooked path of science. For an interesting discussion of the process of law within
the context of depth psychology, see Ellen Kandoian, Law from the Perspective of
Depth Psychology: A Jungian View, 24 U. TOL. L. REv. 515 (1993).
24. See KOESTLER, supra note 21, at 541.
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Part V addresses the separations in society today that are imped-
ing our ability to discuss and reach consensus on the answers to
Holmes's questions in the realm of family law. It discusses problems
with, and causes of, separations in American society. Further, it
presents statistics on the decline of community involvement in
America? and the ramifications of that decline on family law. This
section also explains how Judge Sheldon's proposed changes to the
process of divorce would widen the separation of individual, com-
munity, legislature, and court, and hinder meaningful discussion and
consensus on the substantive level.6 Judge Sheldon supports his
privatized model of uncontested divorce separate from the legal sys-
tem by stating that the role of law is interpretive--that law should
mirror behavior." I suggest that Judge Sheldon's approach ignores
the importance of law's ability to shape behavior-its constitutive
role.29
Judge Sheldon's privatized model undermines both law's interpre-
tive and constitutive nature by taking the formation of much of fam-
ily law out of the hands of the Legislature and the courts and placing
it in the hands of individual couples. Law provides a means for
communal expression. Through that expression the law provides
the means to shape social attitude. By relegating family law to an
isolated private realm, Judge Sheldon supports his attitude that mar-
riage and the nuclear family are dead or dying ideals. 0 By keeping
family law off the public agenda through changes in process, the dis-
cussion of shared public values with respect to family behavior, es-
sential to addressing Holmes's questions, is impeded, and messages
concerning the lack of importance of family are sent. The silence of
the law can be loudly expressive.
While there is nothing inherently wrong with private ordering for
the dissolution of marriage, it is not the most appropriate vehicle for
the formation of law that shapes the core unit of society-the fam-
ily. Through the rules of divorce, the law presents its views of mar-
25. See Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone. America's Declining Social Capital, J.
DEmocRAcY, Jan. 1995, at 65, 68-70.
26. See generally Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of
American Family Law, 83 MacH. L REv. 1803 (1985) (identifying a transfer of moral
decisions from the law to the people the law once regulated).
27. See GLENDON, supra note 1, at 9 ("Law is interpretive when it is engaged in
converting social facts into legal data and systematically summarizing them in legal
language."). The danger with law that is formed entirely by its interpretive nature is
aptly expressed by Clifford Geertz: "Whatever law is after, it is not the whole
story." Id. at 9 & 160 n20 (quoting CurrioRD G.ERrz, LocAL KNow,.xzou: Fut.
THER ESSAYS N IN mRPRE TVE ANTHROPOLOGY 175 (1983)).
28. See Sheldon, supra note 2, at 25.
29. See GLENDON, supra note 1, at 9. ("Law is constitutive when legal language
and legal concepts begin to affect ordinary language and to influence the manner in
which we perceive reality.").
30. See Sheldon, supra note 2, at 48.
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riage and family. We therefore must view the formation of divorce
law in a broad context that considers the family's historical roots in
the law, the value of an interdisciplinary approach to the family in-
stitution, and the benefits of an integrated approach to forming law.
This view should encompass what we perceive as our highest aspira-
tions for society so that we can form law for families based on aspi-
rations higher than efficiency and conformity to present reality. The
key to the problems facing divorce law is not our ability to shake off
a "fear of change," as Judge Sheldon suggests, but rather our ability
to come together and bring to bear all of our varied disciplines as we
answer Holmes's questions to responsibly form family law. While
this Article addresses comments and suggestions by Judge Sheldon
on Maine divorce law, the issues and arguments that I raise are ap-
plicable to the status of family law throughout the fifty states.
II. "SEPARATION PART ONE": UNCONTESTED DIVORCE
A. Background
Currently there are divorce hearings before a judge in all uncon-
tested cases in Maine. Procedurally, a divorce case is commenced
with the filing of a divorce action, a civil suit. If the parties are suc-
cessful, as the majority are, in reaching a negotiated or mediated
agreement, the case proceeds on an uncontested basis. The parties'
agreement is memorialized in a written agreement drafted 3' by an
attorney, a mediator, or the parties and is executed by the parties.
An uncontested hearing is scheduled. Only one of the parties need
appear at the hearing if both are represented by counsel. Through a
series of leading questions posed by the attorney32 for one of the
parties, the attending party presents the main points of the agree-
ment to the court along with the cause of the divorce and a request
that a divorce be granted. The judge routinely accepts the agree-
ment33 and signs the divorce judgment without any inquiry or re-
view of the agreement beyond the standard leading questions
presented by the one attorney. The entire process for an uncon-
tested hearing takes a matter of minutes to complete.
B. Judge Sheldon on Canon Copernicus and Uncontested Divorce
Judge Sheldon suggests the abolishment of filings and hearings in
all uncontested divorces. He believes that filings and hearings in
31. There are virtually no regulations concerning the drafting of settlement
agreements. Therefore, they can be drafted by someone completely ignorant of the
panoply of legal issues surrounding divorce.
32. See Sheldon, supra note 2, at 11-12. Judge Sheldon presents an accurate pic-
ture of uncontested divorce hearings.
33. In the case of pro se parties, the judge normally asks the questions and drafts
the judgment necessitating the presence of both parties.
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uncontested cases are a waste of time,' and that but for the interest
of the Legislature in tradition (its "fear of change"), we could dis-
pense with them. Judge Sheldon begins his analysis with Canon Co-
pernicus, the sixteenth century churchman who discovered that the
sun, rather than the earth, lies at the center of the solar system.
Judge Sheldon suggests that from Copernicus we can learn not to be
afraid of change.3"
Copernicus never set out to discover the center of the universe.'
Rather, he attempted to comport Ptolemy's view of the solar system
with Aristotle's belief that the universe operated on a system of per-
fect circles.37 He had no desire to upset Aristotle's teachings; he
was tied to tradition. Copernicus waited thirty years to publish his
theory because he feared proving it to "ignorants" and "experts." s
The "experts" who created this fear of change in Copernicus's time
were the authorities of the Church.39
Judge Sheldon suggests that, like Copernicus, we hold the key to
dramatic change. ° He believes that we must set aside our tradi-
tional biases and "fear of change," the only impediments to moving
forward. He says that the "experts" impeding change today are
elected representatives in state legislatures.4' It is for this reason
that he suggests that the courts rather than legislatures are more
efficient vehicles of change.
Judge Sheldon, unlike Copernicus, is not afraid of change and is
not afraid to publish his ideas.42 In his article, he makes three points
concerning uncontested divorce:
1. Hearings in uncontested divorces are a "time consuming
and meaningless formality.,43 He suggests that a hearing
is merely a worthless ritual in which the judge simply rub-
ber stamps the agreement by signing the judgment.
2. Hearings in uncontested cases are not mandated by statute
or rule and are therefore unnecessary;45 hearings are not
needed to end civil lawsuits.4
3. It is not necessary to require divorcing couples to file suit
if there is no dispute. 47 Divorce, like every other civil is-
34. See Sheldon, supra note 2, at 9.
35. See id at 11.
36. See id. at 10.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 18.
39. See id. at 19.
40. See 14. at 11.
41. See i. at 19.
42. See id.
43. Id. at 9.
44. See id. at 13.
45. See id. at 16.
46. See 1.
47. See 1.
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sue, should play out in court only if there is a disagree-
ment between the parties.48
Judge Sheldon presents and dismisses four reasons that he says
are often cited for holding hearings in uncontested divorces: 49
1. To comply with Maine statute requiring the court to deter-
mine that the parties have adequate grounds. Judge Shel-
don says there is no such statutory requirement.5
0
2. To prevent fraud.51 Judge Sheldon says testimony is not
necessary to prevent fraud.
3. To comport with the "best interests of the child" standard,
which suggests that courts should inspect parents' arrange-
ments for their children. Judge Sheldon says the statute
does not impose such a requirement.5
2
4. To protect people. Judge Sheldon says we do not need tes-
timony to do this.53 Rather, a sensitive judge can find un-
fairness without testimony, and we simply do not have time
to do this in all cases; so why bother in uncontested
divorces?
Judge Sheldon and I agree that the current model for the uncon-
tested divorce hearing is functionally purposeless. We disagree,
however, as to the existence of legal mandates for uncontested hear-
ings, their essential usefulness and purpose, and the proper solution
to the problem with the current model of uncontested hearings. Be-
cause he recognizes no purpose for hearings, Judge Sheldon suggests
they should be abolished. Because I believe that hearings are neces-
sary and can serve essential purposes, I suggest a reformed model.
C. A Response to Judge Sheldon's Stance on Uncontested Divorce
For some time in Maine there has been mandatory court media-
tion, both pre- and post-divorce, in all domestic relations cases in-
volving minor children.-  It appears under Maine law that the
mandate that sanctions this private ordering of divorce issues also
mandates a continuing and meaningful role for the courts. The me-
diation statute expressly requires that "[a]ny agreement reached by
the parties through mediation on any issues must be reduced to writ-
ing, signed by the parties and presented to the court for approval as a
court order."'55
Private ordering in the form of marital settlement agreements is
differentiated from general contracts by a heightened public interest
See id. at 9.
See id. at 14-15.
See L at 14.
See id.
See id. at 14-15.
See iL at 15.
See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 581(4) (West Supp. 1996-1997).
Id. (emphasis added).
(Vol. 49:321
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in the issues involved in the dissolution of marriage.' There must
have been fair dealing and no violation of public policy for such an
agreement to be valid. The freedom to contract afforded under the
Constitution' is subordinated to the policies embodied in title 19 of
the Maine Revised Statutes. In cases involving minor children, it is
further subjugated by the parens patriae powers of the state.s
Courts, therefore, as an arm of the state, have authority to review
and supervise the majority of settlement agreements. This authority
has been in place in Maine since 187 4 .19 Furthermore, the statute
mandates court review and the court has supported the mandate
through case law.60 Case law supports the position that the court's
authority is not limited to questions involving minor children,61 but
also extends to every aspect of the marital relation, including issues
of property both marital and non-marital, responsibility for debts,
and alimony.' Review of agreements within the context of uncon-
tested divorces is mandated by policy and law, thus necessitating un-
contested hearings. Furthermore, it makes sense for other reasons,
including efficiency and economy.
The majority of all divorces are settled by agreement of the par-
ties and finalized in uncontested hearings.' The twofold reason for
this is driven by considerations related to process. First, there sim-
ply are not enough judges or courtrooms to accommodate the grow-
ing procession of civil and criminal cases needing to be heard."
56. JON D. LEvY, MAmE FAMLY LAv § 102 at 10-3-10-3.0 (1996).
57. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10).
58. See Greenwood v. Greenwood, 113 Me. 226, 229, 93 A. 360, 361 (1915).
59. See Burnett v. Paine, 62 Me. 122 (1874); see also Tapman v. Tapman, 544 A-2d
1265 (Me. 1988).
60. See Tapman v. Tapman, 544 A.2d at 1267; Wardwell v. Wardwell, 458 A.2d
750,752 (Me. 1983) ("It is the divorce court that must, in every instance, determine
that the property settlement is fair and equitable after considering all relevant fac-
tors."); Bagley v. Bagley, 415 A.2d 1080 (Me. 1980); Lindsley v. Lindsley, 374 A.2d
311, 316 (Me. 1977); Coe v. Coe, 145 Me. 71, 71 A.2d 514, 515 (1950).
61. See supra note 60.
62. See supra note 60.
63. See 2 HOmER H. CLARK, JI., THE LAv oF DohMsric RarmoNs iN Tm
UNrrED STATES 408 (2d ed. 1987). Professor Clark notes that 90% of all divorces
are uncontested and estimates quite conservatively that well over 50% are disposed
of by separation agreements. These agreements are alternatively referred to as set-
tlement, separation, or pre-nuptial agreements.
64. See BRLAN J. OsmrnoM & NEAL B. KAUDER, COURT STATISTIc PROJECr,
EXAINING ThE Woiu oF STATE CouRrs 1993, at 3 (1995). Ostrom and Kauder
state:
To many judges, court administrators, and others who have more frequent
contact with the courts, the critical dimension of caseload is not so much
the volume, but how volume is changing over time. And in state courts, the
direction of change is up. Civil, criminal, domestic relations, and juvenile
caseloads have all shown substantial growth since 1984. Ten-year growth
rates of 30 percent (civil and criminal), 40 percent (juvenile), and 60 per-
cent (domestic relations) mean that cases are increasing at least four times
1997)
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Courts, therefore, are constantly looking for ways to control their
dockets by moving the civil calendar.65 Second, domestic relations
cases have been particularly vulnerable to this focus on process. It
has been estimated that domestic relations cases comprise thirty-
eight percent of the civil dockets in this country,' and make up the
fastest growing segment of state court civil case loads.67 Evolving
views of domestic relations and models of resolution have made do-
mestic relations cases the particular target of either a move to re-
duce the civil docket or to reach amicable private settlements.(o'
The divorce settlement agreement has become the vehicle of choice
to resolve divorce issues. 69 The focus on process over substance
suggests that the aim of current divorce law, as Judge Sheldon advo-
cates, is the efficient termination of unhappy marriages.
Divorce cases make up the largest portion of the domestic rela-
tions case load; however, statistics indicate that the percentage
growth in post-divorce case filings far exceeds that of original di-
vorce filings.70 Such statistics suggest that while private ordering of
divorce cases may be efficient in the short-term, it may not bode
well for the long-term unless more thoughtful attention to the sub-
stantive effects of private ordering is factored into the process.
Because the percentage of post-divorce filings far exceeds divorce
filings and the vast majority of divorces are finalized on an uncon-
tested basis,7' this Article proceeds on the premise that the current
use of settlement agreements is neither eliminating nor reducing
post-divorce filings and may in fact be causing their increase. In
faster than the national population. Given that the resources necessary to
process cases in a timely fashion, such as judges, court support staff, and
automation, seldom keep pace, courts must constantly search for more effi-
cient ways to conduct business.
Id. at 3.
65. See id.
66. See Putnam, supra note 25, at 65, 68-70.
67. See id. at 3.
68. See, e.g., UN,,. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE Acr § 306, 9A U.L.A. 216-17
(1987) (promoting "amicable settlement"); Wife, B.T.L. v. Husband, H.A.L., 287
A.2d 413, 415 (Del. 1972); Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in
the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALe L.J. 950, 991-92 (1979)
("[u]ndisputed divorce cases clog the family law system.").
69. See, eg., CLARK, supra note 63, at 408-09. But see JoAN BLADEs, FAMILY
MEDIATION: COOPERATIVE DIVORCE SETTnEMENT 10-11 (1985) (suggesting that
Clark's figures are conservative). Blades observes: "The overall trial rate for do-
mestic relations cases is 16.8% with states reporting rates as high as 35.7% (Califor-
nia) and as low as .3% (New Jersey)." Id. With such a high percentage of divorces
being settled by agreement, the potential effect of such private agreements on the
formation of substantive family law is staggering.
70. OsTRoM & KAUDER, supra note 64, at 29 (showing that between 1988 and
1993 divorce filings increased six percent while support and custody filings increased
38%).
71. See BLADES, supra note 69; CLARK, supra note 63.
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other words, we need to re-think the ends sought by the current
process and consider the costs incurred.
One factor contributing to this situation appears to be the empha-
sis on settlement agreements as the speedy vehicle of process. This
focus diverts attention away from the effects of that process on the
substantive divorce law in post-divorce actions or on the further de-
velopment of substantive divorce law. That lack of attention or
thought is evident in the way in which attorneys use or fail to use the
settlement agreement in post-divorce actions7 and in the confused
body of case law involving settlement agreements in post-divorce
actions.73 The scope of this Article does not allow a complete dis-
cussion of this point. It is important to note, however, because it is
this atmosphere that sets the context for the discussion of a second
point-the diminished attention to uncontested divorce hearings.
As Judge Sheldon points out, in his courtroom, as in the majority
of others, judges routinely rubber stamp settlement agreements in a
process that lasts several minutes and does not require the appear-
ance of both parties. One cause of the problem is that there are no
guidelines for judges. Such a short "ritual" does not allow the judge
the opportunity to review the agreement for internal ambiguities or
for inconsistencies with respect to the substantive law, nor does it
provide time to assure that the agreement is consistent with the di-
vorce judgment. Compounding the problem is the ever-expanding
broad spectrum of legal issues potentially addressed in settlement
agreements such as property,74 trusts and estates,75 tax,76 tort,77
72. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Lurie, 33 Cal. App. 4th 658 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
In Lurie, the custodial parent brought an action to enforce and modify a New York
order in California under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act
(hereinafter URESA), rather than through an action to enforce the parties' agree-
ment (stipulation). Under URESA the California court applied California law and
eliminated support for one of the children.
73. See, e.g., Doris Del Tosto Brogan, Divorce Settlement Agreements: The Prob-
en of Merger or Incorporation and the Status of the Agreement In Relation to the
Decree, 67 NEB. L. REv. 235 (1988); Sally Burnett Sharp, Semantics as Jurisprudence
The Elevation of Form Over Substance in the Treatment of Separation Agreements In
North Carolina, 69 N.C. L Rv. 319 (1991) (discussing the inconsistent approaches
and conclusions that the courts have applied to this issue).
74. See e.g., In re Marriage of Madden, 683 P.2d 493 (Mont 1984).
75. See, e.g., In re Estate of Hereford, 250 S.E.2d 45 (W. Va. 1978).
76. See generally Hawkins v. Commissioner, 86 F.3d 982, 993-94 (10th Cir. 1996)
(holding that the marital settlement agreement satisfied requirements of qualified
domestic relations order, reversing tax court, and concluding that wife must carry
tax burden of one million dollar distribution from former husband's pension plan);
Calmes v. United States, 926 F. Supp. 582, 588 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (concluding that
Internal Revenue Service bound by taxpayers' pre-nuptial agreement to opt out of
community property regime); Hayes v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 593 (1993) (review-
ing agreement to determine status of stocks disposed in separation agreement for
tax purposes); Steven L. Severn & Stephen R. Corrick, Are Post-Remarriage Pay-
ments Alimony?, 81 . TAX'N 184 (1994) (discussing factors that court might weigh in
the characterization as alimony of post-remarriage payments).
1997]
MAINE LAW REVIEW
bankruptcy,78 employment, pension,79 insurance, welfare, and social
security. This partial list does not include issues of contract law,80
constitutional law,8' rules of procedure," or malpractice. 83 The po-
77. One of the most dramatic changes in divorce law is the abolition of inter-
spousal tort immunity. See generally Barbara Glesnar Fines, Joinder of Tort Claims
and Divorce Actions, 12 J. AM. AcAD. MATRim. LAW. 285 (1994). The issues raised
in the Fines article involve the extent to which a spouse may or must join In the
divorce action any tort claims he or she may have against the other spouse. This
issue must be considered when the divorce is resolved via a settlement agreement.
Additionally, most agreements routinely contain general tort claim waiver language.
See also Seymour Benson & Leigh Kniskern, Interspousal Tort Liability: Abrogation
of Interspousal Immunity: Part I, FLA. B.J., Mar. 1994, at 83; Barbara H. Young,
Interspousal Torts and Divorce: Problems, Policies, Procedures, 27 J. FAM. L. 489
(1988-89).
78. See, e.g., Farrey v. Sanderfoot (In re Sanderfoot), 111 S. Ct. 1825, 1831 (1991)
(holding that Bankruptcy Code section 522(f)(1) "requires a debtor to have pos-
sessed an interest to a lien attached, before it attached, to avoid the fixing of the lien
in that interest."); Finalco, Inc. v. Roosevelt (In re Roosevelt), 87 F.3d 311, 313, 319
(9th Cir. 1996) (holding husband's transfer to wife of his interest in jointly held
home was "made" when they signed marital agreement for purposes of the Bank-
ruptcy Code); Engram v. MacDonald (In re MacDonald), 194 B.R. 283 (Bankr. N.D.
Ga. 1996) (involving interpretation of agreement to determine dischargeability of
alimony obligation in bankruptcy); James H. Gold, The Dischargeability of Divorce
Obligations Under the Bankruptcy Code: Five Faulty Premises in the Application of
Section 523(a)(5), 39 CASE W. Rs. L. Rlv. 455, 457 n.8 (1988-89) ("In the over-
whelming majority of cases arising under [section] 523(a)(5), the bankruptcy debtor
is a male who is seeking to discharge divorce obligations to his former wife."); Wil-
liam A. Reppy, Jr., Discharge in Bankruptcy of Awards of Money or Property at
Divorce: Analyzing the Risk and Some Steps to Avoid It, CoMuNITY PRoP. J., July
1988, at 1.
79. See, eg., McMillian v. Parrott, 913 F.2d 310 (6th Cir. 1990); rustees of Iron
Workers Local 451 Annuity Fund v. O'Brien, 937 F. Supp. 346 (D. Del. 1996). In
both cases, the divorce settlements' release of claims did not waive beneficiary rights
in a pension, and the courts applied the federal common law requirement that a
former spouse's waiver of beneficiary rights in an ERISA governed pension must be
specific. See also Mohamed v. Kerr, 53 F.3d 911 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 185 (1995) (involving separation agreement's divestiture of beneficiary status in
qualified ERISA plan).
80. See Rockwell v. Rockwell, 681 A.2d 1017 (Del. 1996) (applying contract prin-
ciples of reformation, recission, and modification to alimony agreement); Frizzell v.
Bartley, 372 So. 2d 1371 (Fla. 1979) (holding that the section of a statute which gives
trial courts authority to modify alimony and support agreements does not violate the
state and federal constitutional prohibition against impairment of contractual obliga-
tions); In re Marriage of Kloster, 469 N.E.2d 381,383 (Ill. App. 1984) (refusing to set
aside amicably agreed property settlements "absent proof of fraud, duress, or vari-
ance with public policy").
81. See Fournier v. Fournier, 376 A.2d 100 (Me. 1977). The Fournier court held
that title 19, section 722-A of the Maine Revised Statutes, Maine's divorce property
statute, was not unconstitutionally vague. In dicta the court recognized the discre-
tionary nature of the statute, but also noted the requirements of the statute.
In enacting § 722-A, the Legislature obviously recognized the need to af-
ford the trial court sufficient flexibility to fashion orders concerning the
division of marital property which are appropriate to each individual case.
On the other hand, the Legislature also sought to guide the exercise of judi-
[Vol. 49:321
TOUR OF DIVORCE LAW
tential list of issues for litigation is extensive84 and has not even be-
gun to be explored by the legal community.as
With so many opportunities for uncertainty, the courts already are
causing and experiencing considerable litigation.s Once lawyers
begin to use their ingenuity to recognize unanticipated uses for set-
tlement agreements, the floodgates of litigation could be opened
wider. In the meantime, unsuspecting couples are signing settle-
ment agreements without fully understanding possible future ramifi-
cations of the terms of their contract on future action by the court.
Therefore, the costs associated with abolishing uncontested hearings
are potentially great and could affect individuals, the community,
and substantive family law.
cial discretion by requiring that the court consider at least three specified
factors in arriving at its decision.
Id, at 103 (emphasis added). See generally Frizzell v. Bartley, 372 So. 2d at 1371;
Shoosmith v. Scott, 232 S.E.2d 787 (Va. 1977).
82. Wiseman v. Wiseman, No. 94-CA-002996-MR, 1996 WL 185046 (Ky. App.
1996) (opinion now unpublished). The court held that a party's non-disclosure of
income earned during marriage was not extrinsic fraud that would justify reopening
divorce decree. The parties entered into a different agreement incident to the di-
vorce. The non-disclosure would have been more successful if the attorney had filed
a contract action. See also Henry v. Edwards, No. 15205, 1996 WL 220385, at 04
(Ohio Ct. App. May 3, 1996) (holding that a decree-incorporated agreement may be
modified only if entire divorce decree is vacated, which was not possible because
petitioner had remarried); Buys v. Buys, 924 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. 1996) (finding that the
1990 amendment to USFSPA which bars the reopening of pre-McCarty decrees does
not bar the woman from enforcing clause of 1920 settlement agreement).
83. See McWhirt v. Heavey, 550 N.VW.2d 327 (Neb. 1996) (holding that a client's
acceptance of a divorce settlement does not bar later malpractice action).
84. One of the areas of law that has been affected by the use of settlement agree-
ments is child support. See, eg., Adam v. Adam, 624 A.2d 1093, 1098 (RI.L 1993)
(holding that because agreement merged with divorce decree, statutory authority
precluded the court from ordering support beyond a child's eighteenth birthday);
Spagnolo v. Spagnolo, 460 S.E2d 616, 620 (Va. 1995) (holding that a judge, in mak-
ing a child support award, could properly follow parties' agreement or statutory
guidelines, but not both; the judge must choose between the agreement and the
guidelines); Sean T. Goguen, Note, Merger Precludes Family Court from Ordering
Support After Child Reaches Majority-Adam v. Adam, 28 Surtou. U.L. Rnv. 545
(1994).
85. In the majority of cases reviewed by this Author, attorneys brought post-di-
vorce actions on behalf of their clients under divorce decrees rather than under
agreements regardless of the post-divorce status of the agreements and seemingly
unaware that their clients might have fared better under a contract action. See, e.g.,
Marino v. Lurie (In re Marriage of Lurie), 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 835 (Cal. 1995). Addi-
tionally, many agreements are now being drafted by mediators operating in an at-
mosphere of "evolving anti-law bias." See Ellen Waldman, The Role of Legal Norms
in Divorce Mediation: An Argument for Inclusion, 1 VA. J. Soc. Po.'y & L 87,90-
91 (1993) (expressing concern about the alienation of the divorce mediation process
from the legal system and resulting unfairness of settlements).
86. The courts have taken inconsistent and varied approaches to the issue of
merger. See generally Brogan, supra note 73; Sharp, supra note 73.
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An uncontested hearing at which both parties are present that in-
volves purposeful regulation and review of the settlement agree-
ment could provide benefits at all levels of lawmaking as well as
accommodate the needs of the family. Initially, guidelines drafted
by the Legislature would need to be drafted to provide focus and
assistance for judges. The formation of guidelines would require
contemplation of society's aspirations for families and family mem-
bers, requiring a social dialogue. Such dialogue would necessitate
the integration of ideas about legal procedure with ideas about the
direction substantive law should follow, in turn forcing considera-
tion of the constitutive nature of law. The guidelines would provide
direction for divorcing parties as well as attorneys and mediators,87
taking lawmaking out of the hands of private ordering and restoring
it to a more integrated process of development. 8
For the parties and families, the purposeful uncontested hearing
would fulfill law's important ritual and symbolic role in keeping with
its essential constitutive nature.89 It would announce that the disso-
lution of a marriage and the resulting disjunction of family is of sig-
nificant interest to society.' It would remind attorneys, mediators,
and parties that fair dealing and other public policy concerns must
play an integral part in private ordering. 1 For the parties it could
provide, in part, a ritual "closing" to marriage that is currently ab-
sent. For the courts it would be a reminder that everything they do
has important repercussions for individuals and society and that
they are part of an integrated process that involves community sen-
timent and legislative mandate as well as legal precedent.92
87. Mediation could become particularly problematic if conducted outside of the
law with no judicial oversight. Many states do not regulate mediation. For back-
ground information on mediation in general, see Joel M. Douglas & Lynn J. Maier,
Bringing the Parties Apart, 49 Disp. REsoL J. 29 (1994).
88. See, eg., BLADn-s, supra note 69.
89. See P.S. Atiyah, From Principles to Pragmatism: Changes in the Function of
the Judicial Process and the Law, 65 IowA L. REv. 1249, 1272 (1980) (describing the
law's "hortatory" function and questioning whether we have "gone too far in dis-
counting the efficacy of the hortatory function of the law"); Carol Weisbrod, On the
Expressive Functions of Family Law, 22 U.C. DAVIs L. Rlv. 991, 994 n.14 (1989)
("[N]o small part of the law's function is to make men good.") (quoting Justice
Brandeis).
90. Likewise, an abolition of the uncontested hearing, which Judge Sheldon ad-
vocates, could send the opposite message. This result seems to comport with his
premise that we must accept the death of marriage and the nuclear family.
91. See supra note 82. See generally Kolmosky v. Kolmosky, 631 A.2d 419,421-22
(Me. 1993) ("[ME. R. Civ. P. 60(b)] does not preclude an independent action attack-
ing a divorce judgment based on fraud or misrepresentation.").
92. If Judge Sheldon's sentiments are representative of those 6f trial judges in
Maine, there is a need for a reminder that trial courts are but a small part of a
broader interrelated process of forming law whose function extends beyond effi-
ciency of process.
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Finally, and most practically, the purposeful uncontested hearing
could cut down on the proliferation of post-divorce flingsP which
would reduce the monetary, temporal, and emotional costs of pro-
longed discord. The hearing could mandate fair dealings between
parties, encourage better drafting of settlements, and prevent ambi-
guities and inconsistencies of language in agreements (as well as be-
tween agreement and judgment). It also could provide sanctions
and costs for parties or counsel who impede the process.
The "costs" of more complex and confused post-divorce litigation
that would result from the suggested abolition of filings and hear-
ings in uncontested cases in favor of private contractual arrange-
ments are high. Potentially greater "costs," however, lie in the
disregard for the expressive or symbolic purposes of law and legal
ritual embodied in the cavalier suggestion to abolish court involve-
ment in the majority of divorces. Because it is through the rules and
ritual of divorce that the law most loudly expresses its views of mar-
riage and family, the symbolic purpose of all filings and hearings in
all divorces is significant. The current move toward privatization of
divorce is already sending messages to society. Because law pro-
vides a means of shaping social attitudes and behaviors, the
messages it sends should be carefully considered. A complete elimi-
nation of filings and hearings in uncontested cases, which make up
the vast majority of divorces, would send a loud expression of the
law's disregard of family and marriage. We must consider the bene-
fits and purposes of ritual and symbol in family law.
D. The Significance of Ritual
Evidence of the importance of family, community, and ritual in
the life of man dates to prehistoric times.94 Although the mother-
child and clan relationships were more important earlier on, for var-
ious reasons, than the relationships between men and women, the
importance of an integrated community and family in the raising of
children and in the forming of society were highly regarded values
that we should not be so quick to dismiss. We continue to cherish
many old rituals and create new ones. In addition to the celebrated
ritual of marriage, we still come together, family, friends, and often
community, as we have since the earliest days of humankind, to
share and memorialize both joys and sorrows.
Divorce, unlike any other momentous occasion in our culture, is
presently without ritual.95 It is also often the most isolated and iso-
93. See supra note 68.
94. See, e.g., JOHN E. PFEIFFER, THE EMERGENCE OF SOcmTm: A PREHISTORY
OF THE ESmBusmENT (1977); G. RENARD, Lium AND WORK rN PRususRIc
Tmrus (R. T. Clark trans., 1968).
95. Divorce is not without ritual in all cultures and religions. The "get" is the
Jewish religious divorce process or ritual. See Alan Reed, Transnational Non-Judi-
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lating.96 The effects of divorce are far-reaching. The lives of family
members, friends, and even the community are affected by the di-
vorce. Children are the most obviously affected; everything in their
world is disrupted and the ramifications are lifelong. 7 Extended
family members and friends of the divorcing family are often asked
to choose between one party or the other. School communities, as-
sociations, and organizations are affected by divorce. Families often
uproot and leave a community entirely. The psychological, socio-
logical, and economic ramifications are enduring. 98
After a death, the Jewish religion observes a period called
"shivah" during which the immediate family members sit in mourn-
ing for seven days following the funeral. 99 Each evening at sundown
prayers are said. During the seven days, family members, friends,
and people from the community come to visit and sit with the imme-
diate family for a short time. People reminisce; they laugh; they cry.
After the seven days, the immediate family members resume their
ordinary activities but there is a recognized one-year extended pe-
riod of mourning.
cial Divorces: A Comparative Analysis of Recognition Under English and U.S. Juris-
prudence, 18 Loy. L.A. INT'L & ComP. L.J. 311 (1996), which presents a clear
description of the "get":
The get is a written document and cannot be pronounced orally. A trained
scribe takes three hours or longer to complete the get, in Hebrew and Ara-
maic. The get is executed in the Beth Din (house of law) in the presence of
three dayans, judges, expert in family law matters. Two competent wit-
nesses, specifically appointed for that particular purpose, sign the docu-
ment. The wife must receive the get in person. The crucial legal act that
dissolves the marital ties is handing the get to the wife.
Itd at 327-28, (citing Berkovits v. Grinberg, 2 All. E.R. 681 (Fain. 1995); CODE OF
MAM omoDEs BOOK FOUR, THE BOOK OF WomEN 166 (Isaac Klein trans., 1972)).
96. Common practice requires only one party to be present at the uncontested
hearing. The other party is usually at home. Divorce often separates divorcing par-
ties from former family members, friends, and even the community. Additionally,
the pain and emotional disruption is experienced in private by each separate mem-
ber of the divorcing family.
97. The statistics concerning fatherless children are grim. See, e.g., Judith S. Wal-
lenstein, Children of Divorce: Preliminary Report of a Ten-Year Follow-Up of Older
Children and Adolescents, 24 J. AM. ACAD. Crmu PSYCHIATRY 545 (1985).
98. See generally Ann Lacquer Estin, Economics and the Problem of Divorce, 2
U.L. Cm. ScH. RouND TABLE 517 (1995); Elizabeth Gleick, Hell Hath No Fury,
TmE, Oct. 7, 1996, at 80 (discussing the movie The First Wives Club and the conse-
quences of divorce on women and children); Saul D. Hoffman, Divorce and Eco-
nomic Well-Being: The Effects on Men, Women and Children, DEL. LAW. 1987, at 18;
Martha Minow, Consider the Consequences, 84 Mic-i. L. REv. 900 (1986); Elizabeth
S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L. REv. 9
(1990); Lynne D. Wardle, Divorce Violence and the No-Fault Divorce Culture, 1994
UTAH L. REv. 741; Weisbrod, supra note 89.
99. See 10 THE NEw ENCYCLOPEDIA BRrrANNIcA: MICROPAEDIA READY REF-
ERENCE 752 (Robert McHenry ed., 15th ed. 1993). "Shivah" means "seven" in He-
brew. See id.
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I have occasionally "conjured up" a ritual of divorce where, fol-
lowing the completion of settlement or hearing and a solemn for-
malization of the divorce, a period like shivah would be observed."co
People could come together to recognize the end of the marriage
and the need to heal, to laugh, to cry, to prepare to move on. There
could be united support for the parties and the children, from family
and friends, in recognition of the pain of divorce. A one-year heal-
ing period would be observed during which the focus would be on
rebuilding stability. Parties would not remarry or cohabitate during
that year.10 '
Admittedly, such a ritual is farfetched." We would need to
come a long way in our civility toward one another before we could
even contemplate such an idea, let alone carry it off. Furthermore,
it is not the role of law to create such ritual. But the idea of the
need for some ritual in uncontested divorce is not so farfetched.
Under our current system, the formal ceremony of divorce (as un-
ceremonious as it is) is conducted in either a contested or uncon-
tested hearing. Following the conclusion of a contested hearing, the
parties await the judge's decision, often for a number of months.
What they ultimately receive is a document purporting to end the
marriage and settle the issues. If no appeal is filed, the divorce is
final thirty days after the entering of the judgment.10 3 The parties
wake up on that morning no longer married. For most people there
is a ring of unreality, an anti-climax. There usually is no real elo-
100. This fantasy stems in large part from the comments of clients who, following
hard fought or simply settled cases often asked me: "Is that all there is?" Certainly
a sense of solemnity and ritual can help clients experience the divorce. See supra
note 95 (discussing the ritual of the "get").
101. Such a rule would probably reduce the likelihood of second (or third) mar-
riages followed by second divorces--certainly a litigation-saving measure. Addi-
tionally, parents could be directed to focus attention on children who suffer from all
of the tension of the divorce process itself and need time to reunite with each parent.
Strong proponents of individual rights might argue that this would be an intrusion
into rights of privacy, and perhaps it might be. However, we seem to have no prob-
lem treating children as adult criminals, creating fatherless homes, and increasing
the likelihood of crime. Do we value individuality over children?
102. American jurisprudence is based on the idea of the "rugged individual." See
generally FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER, Tim FRoNIMR IN A?. RCAN HISTORY
(1962). Alexis de Tocqueville recognized the importance of the relationship be-
tween the individual and the community. See Putnam, supra note 25, at 65-66. Law
has formed in various patterns affected by, among other things, locale and geogra-
phy. At a recent presentation, Professor Bernhard Grossfeld discussed a compara-
tive study of the formation of law. By way of example, Professor Grossfeld pointed
out major differences between Chinese and American jurisprudence suggesting that
the Chinese system, in fashioning remedies, considers the need for individuals to
continue interacting in close proximity within the community after resolution of con-
flict. See Professor Bernhard Grossfeld, The Invisible Hand.- Patterns of Order In
Comparative Law, Address to Faculty at Roger Williams University School of Law
(Sept. 30, 1996).
103. See ME. R. Civ. P. 76.
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sure; life just goes on. The uncontested hearing, perhaps, creates an
air even more separated from reality because there is no opportu-
nity for the parties to be heard or to express their feelings, and usu-
ally only one party is present in the courtroom. The parties'
settlement agreement is presented to the court in a rote presenta-
tion.'" The judge signs the divorce judgment, and the divorce is
finalized on the spot if the parties have signed waivers of appeal.
What was begun with a blood test, licenses, and much ceremony is
ended with a signature on a judgment that the parties receive in the
mail.
Judge Sheldon and others would probably argue that courts are
not the place for ritual, nor do they have the time or resources to
foster it. Besides, ritual is an even more worthless reason for hold-
ing uncontested hearings than the four cited by Judge Sheldon's arti-
cle. 10 5 I would have to agree that uncontested hearings in their
present form serve little purpose, ritualistic or otherwise. However,
it would be a mistake to abolish uncontested hearings for three rea-
sons. First, to do so would send a symbolic message diminishing
recognition of the seriousness of the impact of divorce on people's
lives and diminishing the institution of marriage itself. Second, the
more we encourage private ordering in the area of family law, the
more divorced the individual becomes from the community. We
often forget these days that the recognition of the individual and
individual rights in the United States' doctrine presupposes the indi-
vidual as being a part of, and as caring about, the good of the
greater community." 6 The more divorced we allow people to be-
come from the community, the less able we will be to understand
where we are in the development of our laws and society and where
we want to go.'07 Third, from a legal and economic perspective,
104. See Sheldon, supra note 2, at 11-13.
105. Judge Sheldon recites four reasons for testimony in uncontested divorces,
none of which he finds convincing: (1) the divorce statute requires the court to
confirm adequate grounds for divorce; (2) it is necessary to prevent fraud; (3) courts
need to supervise parents' plans for their children; and (4) we need "to protect peo-
ple, especially women, from overbearing." Sheldon, supra note 2, at 14-15.
106. See, e.g., GLENDON, supra note 1, at 114-19. Professor Glendon discusses
Tocqueville and points out the tension between individualism and community. She
notes that Americans place great value in the concept of individualism, but that they
are less aware of the dangers pointed out by Tocqueville of over-valuing individual-
ism. See id "What can even public opinion do when not even a score of people are
held together by any common bond, when there is no man, no family, no body, no
class, and no free association which can represent, public opinion and set it in mo-
tion." ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA fl at 314 (J. Mayer
trans., Doubleday Anchor 1969) (1840).
107. See Putnam, supra note 25. Professor Putnam discusses the decline of com-
munity and social interaction in America. Such a decline does not bode well for the
law of the family and has ominous implications. See also GLENDON, supra note 1.
Glendon observes:
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improving and maintaining the uncontested divorce hearing is sim-
ply cost-effective in the long run.
My fantasy ritual is clearly just the stuff of imaginative wander-
ings, perhaps the other extreme to Judge Sheldon's proposals. How-
ever, there is a workable middle ground that should be considered.
Trial courts are not conducting purposeful review of agreements.
Additionally, recent case law suggests that in practice the court is
moving away from the stance that the primacy of court authority in
divorce cases to review agreements supersedes the rights of contract
as expressed in the Constitution." This direction will exacerbate
the already confused body of law surrounding divorce settlement
agreements and post-divorce litigation. I therefore reject Judge
Sheldon's approach and make the following proposal for meaningful
hearings in uncontested cases.
E. A Proposed Working Model for Meaningful Hearings
First, prior to the scheduling of all uncontested hearings, all par-
ties desiring to proceed to divorce on an uncontested basis would be
required to submit to the court, in addition to a request for hearing,
the following documents: individual verified property lists and veri-
fied statements of income along with supporting documentation, a
proposed settlement agreement, and a proposed judgment. There
would be an accompanying form provided by the court that would
provide a checklist and a list of questions to be completed separately
by both parties. The questions, which would be aimed at ascertain-
ing fair dealing, competence, understanding, and complete treat-
ment of all the issues, could ask the following: Who drafted the
agreement? Were the parties represented by counsel, and if so,
what are the attorneys' names? Do the parties desire the agreement
to be incorporated into the judgment and merged? This would be
written in plain English. The checklist would include a list of all
possible issues that should be covered by a settlement agreement,
and the parties would indicate whether the item is relevant or not
relevant, and whether it has been addressed in the agreement. The
form would be signed and notarized.
What prepares men for totalitarian domination in the non-totalitarian
world is the fact that loneliness, once a borderline experience usually suf-
fered in certain marginal social conditions like old age, has become an eve-
ryday experience of evergrowing masses of our century. The merciless
process into which totalitarianism drives and organizes the masses looks
like a suicidal escape from this reality. The "ice cold reasoning" and the
"mighty tentacle" of dialectics which "seizes you as in a vise" appears like a
last support in a world where nobody is reliable and nothing can be relied
upon.
Id. at 186 n.23 (citing HANAH ARmND, THE ORIGINs oF ToTALTAmiArnsm 478
(1973)).
108. LEvy, supra note 56.
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Second, prior to the scheduling of the uncontested hearing by the
clerk of the court, a judge (or possibly an appointed master) would
review all the documentation to make certain that all items were
covered and in order. That process would include filling out a
checklist that would itemize all required documents. This list would
be identical to the one filled out by the parties, but would include a
space to note missing documents or questionable items as well as to
ask questions. The reviewer would note internal inconsistencies and
ambiguities in the agreement, as well as inconsistencies and ambigu-
ities between the proposed agreement and the proposed judg-
ment.' °9 A copy of the form would be returned to the parties, and
they would be required to act in accordance with the directives of
the judge or master.
Third, once the parties had complied with all directives, an uncon-
tested hearing would be scheduled at which both parties would be
required to appear. Any ambiguities that needed to be addressed
by the court would be dealt with at the hearing. The parties would
sign an exit form. The judge would make a brief statement,110 and
all documentation would become part of the record in the case.
Fourth, there would be mandated sanctions for parties and attor-
neys who were later found to have acted in bad faith or inconsis-
tently with the public policies being promoted. Such actions would
allow innocent parties to sue both the opposing party and either of
the attorneys."' Additionally, the agreement and/or the judgment
could be altered by the court without disturbing the parties' divorce
status. 12
109. In cases involving pro se parties, no judgment would be required; however,
the judge or master who would be required to draft the judgment could not draft it
until all issues on the form had been resolved.
110. Especially when children are involved in a case, it is incumbent upon the
judge to remind the parties of the interests and powers the state has in the well-
being of their children. The judge could also state that all children suffer from di-
vorce and that meaningful involvement with the children by both parents is essential
to healthy development of children. The parties could be directed to community
services if available. See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, Ttm NEw FAMILY AND
THE NEw PROPERTY 41 n.127 (1981) (citing MAX RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAE STABI.-
rry, DIVORCE, AND THE LAW 127 n.1 (1972) (discussing Swedish matrimonial cere-
mony language).
111. See, eg., Kolmosky v. Kolmosky, 631 A.2d 419 (Me. 1993) (finding that at-
torney acted in bad faith where attorney structured unfair agreement in such a way
that client could not sue). Because the parties would be required to provide finan-
cial information as part of the record of the case, any misrepresentation would be a
fraud upon the court.
112. See e.g., Henry v. Edwards, No. 15205, 1996 WL 220885, at *4 (Ohio App. 2
Dist. May 3, 1996). In Henry, the Ohio court explained that a decree-incorporated
agreement may be modified only if the entire divorce decree is vacated. Therefore,
although the alimony agreement was "unfair," the agreement could not be modified
because the petitioner had remarried. See id
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Such a model for uncontested hearings would ensure fair dealings
in accordance with public policy. Change is also needed for fair res-
olution of contested cases, which would require integrated efforts on
the part of the court, the community, and the legislature.
IH. "SEPARATION PART Two": THE LAW OF ALmoNY-RuLE
vERsus DISCRETION
A. Background
Maine's first alimony statute was enacted in 1821.11 In essence, it
provided that in cases of marital separation and divorce in which the
husband was at fault, the court had the authority to grant alimony to
provide the wife with "reasonable and comfortable support.""1 4 Be-
yond that mandate, the court was afforded expansive discretionary
powers. In 1847 when the legislature revised Maine's statutes, no
changes were made in the alimony statute."1 In the 1857 revision,
alimony was broadened to include payment of a "specific sum."11 6
In this revision no specific reference to purpose was made. The dis-
cretionary manner in which alimony could be awarded was
expanded.
In 1971 the statute was amended to eliminate fault as a considera-
tion. 17 Prior to the amendment, marital fault on the part of the
husband was a prerequisite to the award of alimony. In 1977 the
statute was again revised, this time to make allowance of an award
of alimony to either spouse."' This broadened the discretionary
power of the court further. In all of the revisions since 1821, no
mention has been made of the purpose of alimony; therefore, it can
be assumed the purpose was left entirely to the discretion of the
court. Appellate courts furthered this open-ended standard by de-
ferring to the discretion of the trial court in the absence of an abuse
of discretion, which was rarely found.
In 1989 the legislature dramatically revised the statute, adding
fourteen specific factors a court must consider when determining an
award of alimony. The statute became effective January 1, 1990. It
provides as follows:
§ 721. Alimony
113. See Sheldon, supra note 2, at 22 (referring to P.L 1821, ch. LXXI, § 5).
114. See id.
115. See id. at 30 (referring to P.L 1847, ch. XIII, § 2).
116. See id. (referring to P.L 1857, ch. 60, § 6).
117. See generally Lnvy, supra note 56, at 8-3 (referring to P.1 1971, ch. 399,
§ 21).
118. See Sheldon, supra note 2, at 30 (referring to P.L 1977, cl. 564, § 86).
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1. Factors. The court shall 119 consider the following factors
when determining an award of alimony:
A. The length of the marriage;
B. The ability of each party to pay;
C. The age of each party;
D. The employment history and employment potential
of each party;
E. The income history and income potential of each
party;
F. The education and training of each party;
G. The provisions for retirement and health insurance
benefits of each party;
H. The tax consequences of the division of marital prop-
erty, including the tax consequences of the sale of the mar-
ital home, if applicable;
I. The health and disabilities of each party;
J. The tax consequences of an alimony award;
K. The contributions of either party as homemaker;
L. The contributions of either party to the education or
earning potential of the other party;
M. Economic misconduct by either party resulting in the
diminution of marital property or income;
N. The standard of living of the parties during the mar-
riage; and
0. Any other factors the court considers appropriate.
2. Costs and attorney's fees. The court may order either
party to pay the costs and attorney's fees of the other
party in the defense or prosecution of a divorce.
3. Real estate. The court may order any part of the obligated
party's real estate and, if necessary, the rents and profits
from that real estate to be assigned and set out to the
other party for life.
4. Alternative to alimony. Instead of alimony, the court may
order either party to pay a specific sum to the other party,
as the court may direct.
5. Modification. The court, at any time, may alter or amend
a decree for alimony or specific sum when it appears that
justice requires it, except that a court shall not increase the
alimony if the original decree prohibits an increase. In
making any alteration or amendment, the court shall con-
sider the factors listed in subsection 1.
6. Enforcement The court may use all necessary legal provi-
sions to enforce its decrees.
7. Limitations. This section does not limit the court, by full
or partial agreement of the parties or otherwise, from
awarding alimony for a limited period, from awarding ali-
mony which may not be increased regardless of subse-
119. "Shall" is defined as follows: "To express simple futurity in the first person
and determination, compulsion, obligation, or necessity in the second and third per-
sons." WFBSTER's NEw WoR.LD DicnONARY 1307 (David B. Guralnik ed., 1986).
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quent events or conditions or otherwise limiting or
conditioning the alimony award in any manner or term
that the court considers just.12
B. Judge Sheldon on Johannes Kepler and Maine Alimony Law
Judge Sheldon suggests that Maine's alimony statute is "vacu-
ous," 21 and he blames the Law Court and the legislature for what
he views as the key to the problems facing domestic relations law:
irrational ties to traditionalism and "fear of change." Judge Sheldon
believes that the Legislature's "fear of change" is causing the pas-
sage of useless statutes and points to Maine's alimony statute as a
prime example.22' He believes that the Law Court's "fear of
change" creates circularly reasoned opinions' that preserve anti-
quated traditional views and prevent the sweeping changes that are
necessary. 1' He begins his analysis of the law of alimony with Jo-
hannes Kepler, the early seventeenth century mathematician whose
discoveries of planetary motion formed the foundation of modem
cosmology. Judge Sheldon suggests that from Kepler we can learn
to recognize and avoid circular reasoning.125
Johannes Kepler set out to prove that the universe was built
around geometric figures.' 26 In attempting to prove this nonsensical
theory, he unwittingly discovered three laws of planetary motion.127
Judge Sheldon focuses on what he believes caused Kepler to search
for his geometric universe-circular reasoning. Judge Sheldon sug-
gests that the proof of Kepler's ideas "consist[ed], roughly, in the
deduction that God could only create a perfect world, and since only
five symmetrical solids exist, they are obviously meant to be placed
between the six planetary orbits 'where they fit in perfectly'.[sic]" 128
According to Judge Sheldon, Kepler "was sure that he was right be-
cause he was sure that he was right. '[Y]oung Kepler succeed[ed] in
proving everything that he believe[d] and in believing everything
that he prove[d]."' 9
Judge Sheldon uses the idea of circular reasoning to attack the
Law Court with regard to its approach to the law of alimony. He
suggests that the court is using circular reasoning to remain tied to
120. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 721 (West Supp. 1996-1997).
121. See Sheldon, supra note 2, at 44.
122. See id. at 44.
123. See id at 21, 26, 41-43.
124. See id.
125. See id at 43.
126. See id at 19.
127. See id.
128. Id. at 21 (quoting ARTHR Ko EsTER, THE StrEFmwALuans: A HIsroRy OF
MAN'S CHANGING VISION OF THE UNIVERSE 256 (Arkana Penguin Books 1989)
(1959)).
129. Id (quoting KOESMER, supra note 128, at 257).
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"pre-historic" ideas about alimony and marriage because the court
has a "fear of change." He believes the court should wake up and
begin to form law in accordance with reality.1 30
In his article, Judge Sheldon makes a number of points concerning
the current law of alimony in Maine. He begins with the underlying
premise that "need" is not an adequate basis for alimony,131 and
that ideas about need-based alimony should be changed because
ideas about other things have changed.' 32 He contends that the Law
Court is stubbornly holding on to antiquated precedent in its articu-
lation of need as the purpose of alimony' 33-Maine's alimony stat-
ute'" mistakenly confirms the pre-historic view of need as an
important factor in the award of alimony.135 Judge Sheldon further
states that because need is not an adequate basis for alimony, the
statute has no theoretical anchor.'36 Judge Sheldon concludes the
statute is vacuous, that it means nothing, because it does not articu-
late a purpose acceptable to him. Arriving at this conclusion, he
suggests that as long as trial judges believe what Law Court prece-
dent says about alimony, they will believe that the statute offers
them guidance.' 37 Instead, judges should recognize the statute as a
useless guide and should not be obliged to give it consideration. 138
Any consideration is as meaningless a ritual as trying to see the em-
peror's new clothes.' 39 Judge Sheldon believes the court should
break with precedent and stop saying the purpose of alimony is
need.
Judge Sheldon argues that the court and the Legislature must
change not only their ideas about need-based alimony; they must
also change their ideas about marriage.' 40 According to Judge Shel-
don, developing law should not perpetuate the ideals of marriage,
but rather should reflect human behavior.' 4' Furthermore, the
courts should retain principal authority for change, 42 as reflected in
the forming of family law, because they are better able than the leg-
130. See id at 48.
131. See id. at 29.
132. See id at 25.
133. See id at 29.
134. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 721 (West Supp. 1996-1997).
135. Sheldon, supra note 2, at 29.
136. See id
137. See id
138. See id at 32.
139. See id (referring to HANS CHRSTIAN ANDERSEN, THE EMPEROR'S NEW
CLoTHEs (1959)).
140. See id at 48.
141. See id at 25.
142. See id. at 48.
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islature to accept the death of marriage and the nuclear family and
to formulate law to reflect human behavior.143
Judge Sheldon and I disagree about the express and implied pur-
poses of the statute. We also disagree on its usefulness. Maine's
alimony statute does embody a purpose broader than need; in fact,
it is not only a useful tool for courts but is also a useful and essential
expression of community sentiment. The problems with the statute
are being caused by misapplication.
C. A Response to Judge Sheldon's Criticism of the
Alimony Statute
The alimony statute expands the purposes for which a court can
award alimony from "need," as expressed in the statute of 1821 and
thereafter expressed in case law, to an overall equitable resolution
that broadly considers the realistic post-divorce economic situation
of both parties. It also reduces the discretion of the trial court in the
award of alimony. As indicated in the statement of fact that accom-
panied the statute's amendment, a court must consider all fourteen
factors.' No longer is it within the sole discretion of a trial court to
determine whether and why alimony should be awarded. Following
the enactment of title 19, section 721 of the Maine Revised Statutes
Annotated, a trial court is required to consider fourteen factors
prior to applying any additional factors that it considers appropriate.
Furthermore, it is important to note that the legislature attaches the
discretionary component of the statute to the fourteen mandated
factors with the word "and."' a Therefore, following enactment of
the statute, the trial judge may not choose which factors wiU be con-
sidered; rather, all must be considered.
Although the fundamental rules of marriage and divorce have
been from the beginning, and remain today, primarily statutory,
judges have traditionally wielded broader discretion in divorce cases
143. Judge Sheldon fails to see the inconsistency of his suggestion that hearings
and filings in uncontested cases should be abolished with his suggestion that the
courts should have principal authority in forming family law. See supra note 69
(pointing out how few cases actually go to trial).
144. See Sheldon, supra note 2, at 31 n.72. The fact statement accompanying the
amendment reads: "This bill enumerates the factors a court must consider when
determining an alimony award." Id, (quoting L.D. 656, Statement of Fact (114th
Legis. 1989)). Judge Sheldon suggests that the statute was the sole result of a re-
sponse to a single individual divorce case. He writes: "[Tlhe local community fun-
neled its indignation [about the outcome of the case] into a proposal to amend the
alimony statute. The legislature acquiesced by producing a statute that reminds
judges what they're supposed to 'consider' when they award alimony." Id. In sug-
gesting that the entire driving force for the statute was one case and by saying the
legislature acquiesced, Judge Sheldon ignores what the forming of law is about.
145. Mn. Rnv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 721(1)(N) (West Supp. 1996-1997) (emphasis
added).
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than in any other field of private law.' 46 This is particularly true in
the realm of alimony. The interplay between discretion and rules is
unique in divorce law, and is a source of continuing debate. 147 Dis-
cretion in divorce law derives from the concept of the English courts
of equity."4 The concept grew in American jurisprudence and be-
came particularly prevalent in the area of family law. We are reti-
cent to relinquish its strong hold.
During the past two decades, the law of divorce has grown signifi-
cantly. This is evidenced by the volumes of case law and legislative
output.149 Judicial discretion in divorce cases has also expanded
during this period. 5 ' The progression of the law that has developed
is an odd series of moves from fixed rules to fairly broad discretion,
and finally to attempts to provide guidance through normative
guidelines in such areas as "the best interest of the child," child sup-
port, and alimony. The proliferation of legislation during the past
decades has perpetuated rather than curbed the persistent hold of
discretion on family law. With the exception of the development of
child support guidelines, which are fairly uniformly applied by the
courts, most statutory enactments have been either written or inter-
preted simply as suggested guidelines rather than bright-line
rules.' 5' This is true of Maine's most recently enacted alimony stat-
ute: On its face, the statute appears to reduce the discretion of the
court, but in practice its seemingly objective standards have suc-
cumbed to the discretion of the trial judge.'
This Article proceeds on the premise that Maine's alimony statute
as presently enacted is intended to limit the discretion of the trial
judge and that both the legislature and the courts should take action
to restore the proper balance between discretion and rule.
Because a divorce court's authority derives solely from statute, 53
one might expect that the enactment of section 721 would have
146. See generally Henry J. Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking-Judges Who Can't
and Legislators Who Won't, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 787 (1963); Marsha Garrison, How
Do Judges Decide Divorce Cases? An Empirical Analysis of Discretionary Decision
Making, 74 N.C. L. REv. 401 (1996) (discussing empirical study of the role of discre-
tion in New York divorce cases over a ten-year period); Jane C. Murphy, Eroding the
Myth of Discretionary Justice in Family Law: The Child Support Experiment, 70 N.C.
L. Rev. 209 (1991) (favoring fixed rules).
147. See supra note 146.
148. See Murphy, supra note 146, at 212 (stating that equity puts the spirit of the
law above the letter of the law).
149. Homer H. Clark, Jr., The Role of Court and Legislature in the Growth of
Family Law, 22 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 699, 700 (1989).
150. See generally Garrison, supra note 146.
151. See id at 403.
152. See, eg., Bayley v. Bayley, 611 A2d 570 (Me. 1992); Bayley v. Bayley, 602
A.2d 1152 (Me. 1992). This Author was the attorney for Janice Bayley at trial and
on appeal, and thus has intimate knowledge of the facts, the transcript, the appellate
briefs, and the attitude of the trial judge.
153. See Lnvy, supra note 56, at 8-1.
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changed the treatment of alimony across the board at both the trial
and appellate levels. Surprisingly, this has not occurred. Many trial
judges, while paying lip service to the statute, totally ignore it in
practice, continuing to apply their individualized brand of discre-
tion. Even more disturbing is the appellate court's failure to give
effect to the Legislature's mandate when reviewing alimony awards
under the "abuse of discretion" standard. The Legislature, recog-
nizing that each divorce case is different and requires special consid-
eration, provided in section 721 for the application of the trial
court's discretion on a number of issues. It is clear through the
statement of fact and the statutory language, however, that the in-
tent of the statute is to dramatically curtail individualized discretion.
Thus, although it is incumbent upon the trial judge to consider each
case individually in the awarding of alimony, he or she must do so
within the context of the statute and after having fully considered all
of the enumerated factors. A reviewing court should consider fail-
ure to follow this mandate to be an abuse of discretion.
The failure of the Law Court to properly apply the statute has
resulted in a perpetuation of unprincipled decisions, which when up-
held on appeal create an inconsistent body of case law that under-
mines the purpose of the statute and increases the likelihood of
litigation. The 1992 case of Bayley v. Bayley " is illustrative of the
courts' persistent disregard for the normative guidelines of the stat-
ute. Bayley was the perfect vehicle for the Law Court to clearly
articulate and apply the mandates of section 721, but it missed the
opportunity. Although almost every factor of the statute indicated
the appropriateness of an award of alimony, the trial court com-
pletely ignored the statute and denied alimony. So sure of his dis-
cretionary powers, the trial judge, following an appeal and remand,
continued to ignore the mandates of the statute, necessitating a sec-
ond appeal.
Bayley v. Bayley
Bill and Janice Bayley were twenty-five and twenty-eight years
old, respectively, when they married. Their assets at the time of
marriage consisted of a used car and approximately $2000 in cash.
Janice became pregnant immediately with their only child, a daugh-
ter. During their twenty-five-year marriage, Janice and Bill's lives
revolved around Bayley's Lobster Pound and related enterprises
that they acquired during their marriage. All of their efforts and
investments were put into the business, which they looked to as
their only retirement account. Janice assumed the duties and role of
the traditional homemaker and mother. Additionally, she worked
in the business and was responsible for all aspects of their personal
lives. Bill and Janice maintained these roles until the time of di-
154. See Bayley v. Bayley, 611 A.2d 570; Bayley v. Bayley, 602 A.2d 1152.
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vorce, when Bill would no longer allow Janice to be involved in the
business.
At the time of their divorce, the Bayleys had been married
twenty-five years and were in their early fifties. In addition to the
business, the chief marital asset was real estate personally owned by
the parties in joint tenancy. All of the property, including the mari-
tal residence, was in close proximity to the business. At the time of
the divorce, the marital residence was listed for sale pursuant to an
order of the superior court. The order was issued following a hear-
ing on Janice's motion to order the sale. Testimony at the divorce
hearing indicated that neither party desired to remain in the marital
residence. At the time of divorce, Janice was living in the residence.
Bill was living in a newly furnished apartment that he had recently
built at the business. During the period of separation pursuant to a
consent order, Bill paid Janice $725 per week for support. He paid
this money out of the business as payroll. At the time of the di-
vorce, Janice was working in a dental office. She earned a gross
salary of approximately $20,000 and netted $14,000 after taxes. Un-
refuted testimony at the divorce hearing indicated that Janice's basic
monthly expenses to remain in the marital residence were $4000.
Bill's actual monthly expenses as determined at trial were approxi-
mately $1150.
Several months after the lengthy hearing, the trial judge issued his
judgment.'5 5 He divided the marital assets disproportionately, with
Bill receiving over twenty-five percent more than Janice. Bill was
awarded the business and all of the parties' real estate, which in-
cluded income property. Janice was awarded the marital residence.
Almost one-third of the property distributed to Janice consisted of
unsecured payments from Bill of $100,000 over a ten-year period.
Alimony and legal fees were denied. The judgment was two and
one-half pages in its entirety and provided no rationale for the
judge's decision. It consisted primarily of a list of the marital assets
with applied values and a designation of which property was to be
set aside for which party. With regard to alimony, the court de-
creed: "It is further ORDERED that no award of alimony or attor-
ney's fees is made to either party.' 156 There was no mention of the
statute, no findings of fact (other than applied values to property),
and no conclusions of law.
Janice first filed a motion with the court in accordance with Rule
52(a) of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure,"5 7 requesting the court
to make specific findings of fact and to state separately its conclu-
sions of law on a number of issues including the denial of alimony.
155. Bayley v. Bayley, No. CV-88-1226 (Me. Sup. Ct. Jan. 17, 1991).
156. Id.
157. ME. R. Crv. P. 52(a).
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The trial court denied Janice's motion for further findings, and
Janice's first appeal followed.
On appeal, the Law Court perpetuated the trial judge's failure to
even pay lip service to the alimony statute (although it did remand,
finding that the trial judge had abused his discretion by failing to
make specific findings of fact upon request pursuant to Rule
52(a)). 58 In this case, the reviewing court had before it a transcript
that amply supported an award of alimony under the statute and
indicated an abuse of discretion. Bayley provided all the facts and
circumstances for the court to articulate the responsibilities of a trial
judge under the revised statute. Nevertheless, the court chose to
pay deference to what it viewed as the broad discretion of the trial
judge.
The evidence may well support the court's decision and, had
Janice not requested specific findings of fact, it could have
been assumed that the appropriate findings had been made.
However, where a party has moved for specific findings of fact
the divorce court is obliged to do more than recite the relevant
criteria and state a conclusion. 5 9
On remand, the trial judge obviously had confidence in his broad
discretionary powers because, except for making a minor correction
on one minor issue, he ignored even the Law Court's mandate to
provide findings. A second appeal followed."6 Apparently an-
noyed with the trial judge, the Law Court remanded the case again,
this time to a different judge. Even in Bayley II, however, the court
missed the opportunity to chastise the trial judge with regard to his
application of the alimony statute. 61 Once again it passed up the
opportunity to remind trial judges generally that they must consider
the fourteen factors of the statute when considering an award of
alimony.' 62 To its credit, the Law Court did include the statute in
the decision; however, the statute was mentioned in the context of
possible inequities in the property distribution, and the discussion
was aimed at the replacement judge.
The Bayley case is indicative of the unreasonable hold discretion
has in divorce cases. Although the statute clearly changed the de-
lineation of discretion at the trial level, the Law Court chooses to
perpetuate discretion and to inadvertently encourage costly, pro-
longed, and unnecessary litigation.'6
158. See Bayley v. Bayley, 602 A.2d at 1153-54.
159. Id. at 1154.
160. See Bayley v. Bayley, 611 A.2d 570 (Me. 1992).
161. The Law Court seemed far more disturbed by the failure of the trial judge to
adhere to its mandate than by his failure to apply the statute properly. The court
had ample facts in the transcript to which to apply the law.
162. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. fit. 19, § 721 (West Supp. 1996-1997).
163. Ultimately, after excessive costs and unnecessarily prolonged litigation (in-
cluding two appeals and two remands), Janice Bayley received everything that she
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D. A Proposed Solution
I propose that proper application of the statute could be obtained
through an expanded legislative mandate for judicial adherence to
statutes at the trial level and more meaningful review at the appel-
late level. The Law Court must reduce the role discretion plays in
divorce cases in instances where statute or common sense mandates.
Mere lip service to normative statutes is not sufficient. The Law
Court should adjust the application of the abuse of discretion stan-
dard. Although the court has the authority to adjust the application
of normative statutes through case law, it appears unlikely that it
will be so moved in the near future. Therefore, I propose that con-
cerned parties and attorneys expand their efforts beyond appeals.
Interested parties' energies might be better spent garnering commu-
nity support and lobbying the Legislature to clarify the mandatory
nature of application of the alimony statute. I suggest that the Leg-
islature require trial courts to clearly and specifically apply the ali-
mony statute and other statutes to the facts of cases.' 4
I further propose that where specific statutory guidelines exist,
parties should not be burdened with requesting findings in order to
protect themselves on appeal. Moreover, the Legislature should re-
quire the Law Court to consider the specific factors of the statute
upon review.'65 Lawyers can also help the process by "trying cases
had asked for: alimony as well as a number of adjustments to property distribution.
Had the statute been properly applied, two years of litigation could have been
avoided. In the end, both Janice and the statute were vindicated.
164. Title 19, section 721 of the Maine Revised Statutes should be amended to
provide for mandatory application by trial judges supported by specific findings in
the divorce judgment. Additionally, a failure to apply properly the 14 factors to the
facts of a case should be deemed an abuse of discretion.
165. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 721 (West Supp. 1996-1997); see also, e.g.,
Rodrigue v. Brewer, 667 A.2d 605 (Me. 1995). The Rodrigue case was an appeal
from divorce proceedings on the issue of child custody. The child in question, who
was two and one-half years old at the time of the divorce, was conceived in the first
months of the marriage. The parents separated shortly after the conception. They
reunited for a short period of time after the birth. During the divorce proceedings
the parents expressed their desire to have joint or shared physical custody and con-
trol of the child. The parents refused to talk or agree about anything. The mother
was a high school graduate, and the father was a dual doctoral candidate pursuing
degrees from schools in southern Maine and Canada. He planned to be in Canada
for 18 months following the divorce. See id at 606.
At trial, experts testified that the intense conflict between the mother and father
substantially impaired their ability to cooperate in parenting the child. See id. at 608.
Nevertheless, the trial judge awarded shared physical custody, ordering the child to
spend alternating weeks with each parent-without concern for the geographical
difficulties. See id. at 606. He awarded the mother sole control of the child's reli-
gious upbringing and gave the father decision-making control over the child's educa-
tion. See id
The mother appealed from the district court to the superior court, where the judg-
ment was affirmed. See id She then appealed to the Law Court where the judgment
was again affirmed and no abuse of discretion was found. In a strong dissenting
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to the statute"-that is, by getting evidence on the record for each
relevant factor and making clear when the evidence is refuted. By
providing the appellate court with a clear record on appeal1 to
which a meaningful standard of review can be applied, unnecessary
litigation can be avoided and an internally consistent body of case
law can be developed.
This process is dependent on our ability to reintegrate our ways of
doing and knowing. Commentators such as Carl Schneider suggest
that the perpetuation of discretion in family law is due, at least in
part, to the failure of society to reflect upon and articulate the goals
of family law.167 Such comments support the underlying premise of
this Article that separations at all levels of the lawmaking process
are impeding the development of a consistent, responsive body of
law. The development of divorce law must be guided by a thought-
ful and continuing social dialogue in which the community, the legis-
lature, and the courts take part.
IV. "INTEGRATION PART ONE": THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Arthur Koestler's book, The Sleepwalkers,16s provides insight into
the separate "ways of knowing" that arose over time and shaped
opinion, Justice Rudman questioned the appropriate meaning of "abuse of
discretion":
I have no quarrel with the District Court's findings of fact in this case.
On the basis of those undisputed findings, however, the court must act
within the bounds of its discretion in assigning parental rights and responsi-
bilities. We review the court's assignment of parental rights for an abuse of
the court's discretion in determining the consequences of its factual find-
ings.... Discretion is not an absolute standard. The discretion accorded a
trial court varies according to the principles identified as controlling a par-
ticular discretionary determination. When we say we review the court's
determination for abuse of discretion we mean we have the responsibility
to determine whether the court acted within the principles identified as
bounding that discretionary determination. If the court acts within its prin-
cipled bounds, its determination is entitled to deference. If, however, as
here, the court's determination strays from these principles, that determi-
nation constitutes an abuse of the court's discretion.
Id. at 607-08.
166. For an example of the efficiency of a clear record, see Gray v. Gray, 609
A.2d 694 (Me. 1992), another of this Author's cases which went up on appeal on a
number of issues, including the awarding of alimony. This Author represented Mary
Ann Gray, whose husband appealed after she was awarded alimony. The trial judge
wrote a detailed judgment applying the statute to detailed evidence presented at
trial as well as to a detailed trial brief. For contrasting examples, see, e.g., Jacob v.
Jacob, 507 A.2d 596 (Me. 1986) (parties' failure to request further findings deterred
appeal); Cushman v. Cushman, 495 A.2d 330 (Me. 1985) (failure of the parties to
present sufficient evidence, failure of the court to draft a specific order, and failure
of the parties to request further findings made appeal difficult); Baker v. Baker, 444
A.2d 982 (Me. 1982) (no transcript and unclear judgment).
167. See generally Schneider, supra note 26, at 1824-25.
168. KonTs.s , supra note 21.
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ways of thinking and doing. Koestler's views concerning separation
of the various disciplines and the continuing development of scien-
tific endeavor are helpful in understanding the problems facing the
development of family and divorce law today. I am grateful to
Judge Sheldon for selecting Koestler's book as the framework for
his article, although he chose to pull only two threads-fear of
change and circular reasoning-from the rich fabric of Koestler's
story. Perhaps he subconsciously recognized The Sleepwalkers' true
relevance.
A. Koestler's Sleepwalkers
The Sleepwalkers is the story of the development of the branch of
physical science known as cosmology. In telling his story of the cos-
mologers, including Canon Nicholas Copernicus and Johannes
Kepler, Koestler recognizes that he is actually telling the story of
man's spiritual quest for an understanding of nature and of man's
place in the universe.' 6 9 He understands that these men, who were
the fathers of what we view as the "Scientific Revolution," were re-
ally in search of a new philosophy to help them find the true nature
of man's situation.170 Copernicus, Kepler, and others wanted to un-
derstand nature, not conquer it.171 They were on a spiritual quest.
Koestler, placing the cosmologers and the new bodies of knowl-
edge they unwittingly discovered in a broad theoretical and histori-
cal context, presents not only their discoveries, but also the
evolution of their thoughts."7 He considers the psychology of dis-
covery and change, 73 and explores the development of new bodies
of knowledge, the splitting off of various disciplines, and the conse-
quent behavior of man. Koestler considers what effects the subse-
quent conquest of nature had on more spiritual inquiries and
explores the impact of science on the humanities. 74 He considers
the interrelated yet separated threads of science and religion' 75 and
understands that although science is commonly regarded as logical
and rational, it has developed along an irregular course, not the ex-
pected ascending line.1 7 6
Koestler recognizes that the history and development of science
reflect the unconscious prejudice, as well as the philosophical and
169. See id. at 13.
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. See IU at 14 n.2 (citing KOESTLER, supra note 21).
174. See iU at 14.
175. See id.
176. See id. at 15, 50. One of the main topics of Koestler's book is the crooked
path of science. For an interesting discussion of the process of law within the con-
text of depth psychology, see generally Kandoian, supra note 23.
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political biases, of their authors."7 In other words, he recognizes
that science, like all other disciplines (law included), has been detri-
mentally affected by the splitting off or separation of the various
branches of man's knowledge. He concludes that all disciplines will
more successfully serve man if they operate in an atmosphere of
integrated ideas and inquiries. Furthermore, he suggests that man's
salvation here on earth is dependent upon his ability to reintegrate
his ways of knowing.178 In short, Koestler's Sleepwalkers is a story
about separation and integration:
I believe, nevertheless, that the story outlined in this book wil
be recognized as a story of the splitting-off, and subsequent
isolated development, of various branches of knowledge and
endeavor-sky-geometry, terrestrial physics, Platonic and
scholastic theology-each leading to rigid orthodoxies, one-
sided specializations, collective obsessions, whose mutual in-
compatibility was reflected in the symptoms of double-think
and "controlled schizophrenia." But it is also a story of unex-
pected reconciliations and new syntheses emerging from ap-
parently hopeless fragmentation. Can we derive some positive
hints from the conditions under which these apparently spon-
taneous cures occur? 179
Indeed, Koestler anticipated that his thesis might be misunderstood.
B. Judge Sheldon's Use and Misuse of Koestler's Sleepwalkers
Judge Sheldon's article is framed by what he views as Koestler's
thesis: that biases impede change and cause sleepwalking develop-
ment."s He quotes from The Sleepwalkers:
[A]ll cosmological systems, from the Pythagoreans to Coperni-
cus, Descartes, and Eddington, reflect the unconscious
prejudices, the philosophical or even political bias of their au-
thors; and from physics to physiology, no branch of Science,
ancient or modem, can boast freedom from metaphysical bias
of one kind or another .... The history of cosmic theories, in
particular, may without exaggeration be called a history of col-
lective obsessions and controlled schizophrenias; and the man-
ner in which some of the most important individual discoveries
were arrived at reminds one more of a sleepwalker's perform-
ance than an electronic brain's.18 '
Judge Sheldon extracts his ideas of the "sleepwalking" develop-
ment of divorce law from this passage. His article concludes that
177. See Kosmnm, supra note 21, at 514. Koestler understands that the science
of a given time is a reflection of a world view and that by studying science, we are in
fact studying the evolution of thought.
178. See i. at 541-42.
179. Id. at 518.
180. See Sheldon, supra note 2, at 8.
181. Id. (quoting KoE.smnR, supra note 128, at 11) (alteration in original).
1997]
MAINE LAW REVIEW
"we can learn a lot, and save a lot of embarrassment, by studying
Koestler's thesis."' 82
Although Judge Sheldon gains an interesting and appropriate title
for his article from Koestler's book, he misses the broader context of
Koestler's thesis. He extracts only the ideas of "fear of change" and
circular reasoning, thereby narrowing his view of the issues he
presents. Koestler's broader context would have provided a more
appropriate forum for his analysis of divorce law. In the final analy-
sis, Judge Sheldon reaches faulty conclusions because he uses a tun-
nel vision similar to those of the sleepwalkers he describes. It is
ironic that he uses Koestler's book, which in reality has such a rele-
vant message, 83 to arrive at such insular conclusions.
C. The Advantages of Broad Historical Perspective
History is supposed to provide a knowledge of the larger con-
text within which our lives take place. History is not just the
evolution of technology; it is the evolution of thought. By un-
derstanding the reality of the people who came before us, we
can see why we look at the world the way we do, and what our
contribution is toward further progress. We can pinpoint
where we come in, so to speak, in the longer development of
Civilization, and that gives us a sense of where we are
going.184
It is worthwhile to pause and understand the nature Qf the spiri-
tual quest on which Koestler's cosmologers embarked"s because it
provides a useful lens through which to view the current state of
family law'8 6 and to set a course for its development.'l It is impor-
tant to remember that during the Middle Ages reality was defined
by the Church, which placed man at the center of the universe.
The Church taught that life was a spiritual test and winning or losing
salvation 8 9 depended upon the choice between the two opposing
182. Ld.
183. See generally infra part I(c).
184. JAMES REDFIELD, THE CELESTNE PRoPHEcY 20 (1993).
185. See id. at 20-29.
186. See generally GLENDON, supra note 1 (describing and explaining the direc-
tion of family law in industrialized western societies in historical and sociological
terms); Frances E. Olsen, The Family and The Market A Study of Ideology and
Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1497 (1983); Scott, supra note 98.
187. See REDFIELD, supra note 184, at 22. This view of history is borrowed from
Redfield's view, which mirrors Koestler's book in many ways and which reunites
spirituality with the scientific revolution. See generally Carl E. Schneider, The Next
Step: Definition, Generalization, and Theory in American Family Law, 18 U. MicH.
J.L. REFORM 1039 (1985) (suggesting the need for more generalization in family law
scholarship).
188. See REDFIELD, supra note 184, at 22.
189. See id.
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forces in the universe: the force of God and the destructive forces
of the devil.190
Another important layer to this reality was the belief that man
was not equipped to undergo this spiritual test alone. The Church
provided interpretation, direction, and a means of communication
with God.191 A failure to follow the Church's teachings meant cer-
tain damnation and excommunication. For men of this medieval
world everything was explained in spiritual terms.9z
During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, cracks in this world
view began to develop. Certain improprieties by churchmen caused
the Church to lose its credibility with segments of society. There
was a growing idea that no middleman was necessary to interpret
the scriptures; new churches formed. The very reality of the popu-
lace was shaken. There was no longer a clear consensus about the
universe and man's purpose.193 Not suprisingly, Copernicus and
Kepler, religious men, sought a "new philosophy" to explain their
traditional view of reality. Their world was in upheaval, and they
therefore sought a new stabilizing view of man's purpose in nature.
As Koestler points out, the time must be ripe for the adoption of a
new idea.194 With the world in upheaval, society may not have been
ready for the fUll realization of scientific discoveries such as those of
Copernicus and Kepler. By the 1600s when astronomers had openly
proven that the earth was not the center of the universe, but rather
was a very minor player, mankind had lost its place at the center of
God's universe-an earth-shattering discovery.
The scientific revolution, therefore, began as nothing more or less
than an attempt to build a new "way of knowing" the nature and
purpose of existence.195 It gained, however, a new focus bent on
conquering the world, on making life more comfortable and secure.
Somewhere along the way the spiritual aspect of the quest was lost,
and the new focus became a means to an end. 96
In the epilogue of his book, Koestler suggests that an "ends-justi-
fies-the-means" philosophy may lead to "our undoing." 1 He dis-
cusses the divorce of faith and science and implies that man's
salvation rests in our ability to rejoin the two.19s Koestler views the
190. See id. at 22-23.
191. See &L at 23.
192. See ia
193. See id. at 23-24.
194. See KOESTLER, supra note 21, at 519.
195. See REDFmm, supra note 184, at 25-26.
196. See id. at 26.
197. KoEmStER, supra note 21, at 542.
198. See id. at 528-42.
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spirituality that existed in men such as Kepler and Copernicus to be
a good thing.'99 Judge Sheldon seems unaware of its existence.2 °0
What does all this have to do with divorce law? It suggests that
our cost-effective, process-oriented approach to life has served a
purpose, but that it should not be a means to an end as Judge Shel-
don seems to suggest. As Koestler concludes, such an end could be
disastrous. Now that we have the ability to meet the world's basic
material needs, it is incumbent upon us to reconsider our values and
ideals, how they will be articulated, and how they will draw us for-
ward.20' We must not make sweeping changes as Judge Sheldon
suggests before first fully considering the potential effects of those
changes.2 °2 We must keep in mind that law is both interpretive and
constitutive when we analyze where we are about to go in family
and divorce law and that the analysis must be prefaced by an ongo-
ing social dialogue. We must reintegrate our ways of knowing to
meet these challenges.
V. "INTEGRATION PART Two": THE FUTRE OUTLooK
An integrated process involving the court, the community, and
the legislature is critical in the forming of law, especially the law of
the family, which is so dependent on the law's constitutive nature.
The ability of these three players to come together to reach suffi-
cient consensus to develop law that is responsive to the needs of
society-present and future-is dependent on our ability to engage
in social dialogue. Judge Sheldon's approach to the forming (and
unforming) of the law of the family impedes, or perhaps altogether
halts, the means for social dialogue by eliminating the role of the
199. See id at 542. "Spirituality" is used here to mean the search for an under-
standing of the nature of man and of man's place in the universe.
200. See Sheldon, supra note 2, at 20-21. Judge Sheldon is "astonished" at
Kepler's behavior because he ignores Kepler's spirituality.
201. See, eg., KOESTER, supra note 21, at 122. Again, Koestler offers insight:
"The reformation of religion and the renaissance of science were related processes
of breaking up petrified patterns of development, and going back to their sources to
discover where things had gone wrong." Id Because Judge Sheldon approaches the
issues with a predisposition for radical change, when he goes back to analyze court
and legislative actions he sees only "fear of change." If Judge Sheldon is going to
break the "sleepwalking" trend, he must consider the broader aspects of social
changes and their effects.
202. Perhaps Oliver Wendell Holmes could persuade Judge Sheldon to look
more broadly to interdisciplinary sources:
The way to gain a liberal view of your subject is... to get to the bottom of
the subject itself. The means of doing that are, in the first place, to follow
the existing body of dogma into its highest generalizations by the help of
jurisprudence; next, to discover from history how it has come to be what it
is; and, finally, so far as you can to consider the ends which the several
rules seek to accomplish, the reasons why those ends are desired, what is
given up to gain them, and whether they are worth the price.
Holmes, supra note 12, at 476.
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Legislature, criticizing the court for failure to make dramatic
changes, suggesting private ordering of the dissolution of marriage
apart from the law and the legal system, and operating on the fallacy
that law has only an interpretive role and should conform to behav-
ior. Judge Sheldon creates separations at all levels of the forming of
law, and in so doing he ignores and impedes the reintegration that is
essential for not only the survival of meaningful family law, but also
for the survival of man.
A Social Dialogue of Legislatures and Courts
The legislative and judicial branches of government are effective
only when they operate in concert003 It is legislative purpose, if not
always practice, to reflect community values. Therefore, the legisla-
ture has the ability to encourage social dialogue. Furthermore, the
legislative process, operating in accordance with the plans of our
founding fathers, requires the involvement of the citizenry. The leg-
islature fulfills a function separate from that of the courts, a fact
Judge Sheldon seems to ignore. The entire community can bring
issues directly to the attention of the legislature,' whereas citizens
may only address the court when they have a conflict that meets
jurisdictional and other requirements. Even then, the court is only
permitted to address the issues of a particular case. In contrast to
the courts, the legislature operates relatively unfettered and is there-
fore able to implement a rapid response to societal needs. s Also
contributing to the legislature's greater flexibility is the fact that, un-
like the courts, it may enact statutes without regard to precedent. It
has been successful in providing normative guidelines, 0 6 if not al-
ways successful in reducing discretion. On both the state and na-
tional level, the legislature has been able to respond to the needs of
society in a number of areas relating to family law. '
203. See generally Clark, supra note 149; Friendly, supra note 146.
204. See generally Friendly, supra note 146.
205. See id
206. See; e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 311(3) (Vest Supp. 1996-1997)
(child support guidelines).
207. See eg., Clark, supra note 149; see also UNUo. MARRIAGE AMD DIVORCE
Acr, 9A U.L.A. 147 (1987) (providing a useful drafting model for legislatures wish-
ing to implement new policies that is now used by 33 states to implement one ground
for divorce); UNwt. SERViCES FoumEa SpousEs' PROmScrON Acr OF 1982, Pub. L
No. 97-252, 96 Stat. 730 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.)
(authorizing military pensions to be included as marital property); Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of titles 5, 18, 26, 29, 31, & 42 U.S.C.) (dealing
with treatment of private pensions upon divorce and implementing the use of Quali-
fied Domestic Relations Orders); UNw. CHaD CUSTODY JUruSDCUON Acr
(UCCIA), 9 U.L.A. 115 (1988); Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980
(PKPA), Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 8(a), 94 Stat. 3569-74 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 28 U.S.C. § 1738A).
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The courts are ill-suited to effectuate rapid change.2 °s For courts,
ample precedent is often a prerequisite to change and the goal, if
not the result, of case law is to produce a consistent body of law.
Therefore, the courts move forward in small steps, attempting to ap-
pear consistent, even when they are not, always afraid of the slip-
pery slope.20 9 Fear of the slippery slope serves a useful, if not
always appreciated, purpose. It acts as a form of social dialogue
with the community210 about the direction the law should take. It
slows the process to enable change to be conscious and to prevent
unintended results. Like the legislature, courts are more likely to
help produce change when they have support from the community,
political elites, administrators, officials, and citizens. Courts, in re-
sponding to individual cases, are better able to recognize and make
evident inconsistencies, gaps, omissions, and inequities of statutes in
practice.
Courts can test the effectiveness and responsiveness of statutes,
and statutes, in turn, can help the courts produce responsive law.
Together, courts and legislatures can reduce litigation by creating
predictability and by balancing discretion and rules. They can create
and implement fair-handed public policy. The courts and the legis-
lature must work together, however. Legislatures must produce
clearly articulated statutes, and they must remain active in the pro-
cess. They must be alert to misapplication as well as unanticipated
consequences of statutes, and they must adjust statutes accordingly.
The formation of domestic relations law must involve social dia-
logue, and the development of law, especially through the formation
of legal precedent, can serve as a form of social dialogue.
B. Social Dialogue in the Community
As Koestler demonstrates so well, the separation of disparate and
one-sided disciplines with which man attempts to interact with his
world is causing far-reaching problems. Separation is rampant in
today's society. We experience it on many levels. Within the realm
of family law it is felt acutely. Not only are families separating, but
they are splintering in such a way that they often become alienated
from their community. Society is experiencing broad-based
problems involving children separated from parents for various rea-
sons and in various ways.21" ' Judge Sheldon suggests separating fam-
ilies further from the community by removing the dissolution of
208. See generally Friendly, supra note 146.
209. See, eg., Rodrigue v. Brewer, 667 A.2d 605 (Me. 1995). Justice Dana of the
Maine Supreme Judicial Court graciously discussed with me some of the issues I was
researching for this Article. He expressed fear of the proverbial slippery slope as a
problem in the Rodrigue case.
210. See eg., Kandoian, supra note 23, at 560-61.
211. A recent NBC Nightly News broadcast with Tom Brokaw presented a story
on the social ills in America that are getting worse-all involve and affect children:
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families from community purview to private directive. In making
this suggestion, he advocates a purely interpretive approach to fam-
ily law development that mirrors his view of marriage and the nu-
clear family, but that may not be representative of community
sentiment.2 Judge Sheldon dismisses entirely other voices sug-
an increase in child abuse, an increase in teen suicide, an increase in drug abuse, an
increase in the school dropout rate, and a widening gap between rich and poor.
The issue of fatherless children is on the national agenda. The focus directed at
the March on Washington is a prime example. Nineteen million children live apart
from their fathers for various reasons. See, e.g., Leslie Taylor, Fatherhood Issue
'More Intense',- Initiative Leader Working Toward Igniting Debate on 'Crisis of
Fatherlessness, RoANOKE Tmms & WoRLw Nuws, Oct. 11, 1995, at C3 (discussing
some discouraging statistics concerning fatherless children: fatherless children are
five times more likely to live in poverty, are twice as likely to drop out of school; and
are more likely to resort to violence and delinquent behavior). We must consider
this social reality when forming law for the family.
212. See ag, Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419
(1996). This Act seeks to protect the institution of traditional heterosexual marriage
and to protect the right of states to formulate their own laws regarding the legal
recognition of same-sex unions. It was signed into law by President Clinton on Sep-
tember 21, 1996. Without getting into any substantive discussion of the Act, its title
alone signifies that marriage as it has been known in the traditional sense is consid-
ered worth protecting.
Another example of community support and interest in marriage is the Partners
Program sponsored by the American Bar Association. This program, initiated in the
public school system, teaches children about marriage in an attempt to help them
eventually make better choices concerning marriage.
The continuing centrality of marriage in our culture belies Judge Sheldon's senti-
ment that marriage is dying and that we should not revive the ideals. In fact, a
flourishing industry has grown around marriage and weddings. We have bridal
showers, bridal magazines, and bridal shops. We have wedding chapels, wedding
halls, wedding caterers, and wedding photographers.
Most Sunday newspapers have a special bridal section. The celebration of mar-
riage continues long after the wedding. We memorialize anniversaries giving special
symbolic meaning to milestone dates such as the silver and golden wedding anniver-
saries. We display wedding albums and photographs in our homes and continue to
share them with family and friends. The celebration surrounding marriage is even
greater than that surrounding the birth of a child.
Indeed, the pomp and ceremony surrounding weddings continues to be a much
loved and joyous tradition throughout the various cultures of the world. On any
given Saturday in America, small town or urban metropolis, when we hear the ring-
ing of church bells, we turn to catch a glimpse of the bride and groom and we smile.
Weddings bring together families, friends, and even the community in a shared mo-
ment of joy. Weddings are steeped in tradition, hope, and spirituality whether set in
a church, a synagogue, a home, or under the stars. Weddings symbolize our connec-
tion to one another, to family, to community, and to an even greater cosmos. Mar-
riage is still an important cornerstone in our culture as is the family. We should not
be so quick to dismiss its ideals.
According to the U.S. Bureau of the Census, in 1970, 95 million people in the
United States were married; in 1980, 104.6 million were married; in 1990, 112.6 mil-
lion were married; and in 1992, 113.3 million were married. See U.S. BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, STATImSTCAL ABSTRAcr OF THE UNrrw STATES 53 (113th ed. 1993).
These figures represent a decline of approximately 10% of the total population over
18 years of age who were married in 1992 compared with 1970. In 1992, 8.8% of the
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gesting that family law should incorporate what the community per-
ceives as the highest aspirations for society and that it should not
merely conform to current societal behavior.213
The failure of society to consider or reach a consensus on aspira-
tions for the future of family law is endemic of a more pervasive
problem-a decline in social capital. In Bowling Alone,2 14 commen-
tator Robert Putnam sheds light on why we are experiencing such
difficulty. Putnam presents statistics that suggest that Americans'
direct engagement in politics, government, and community activities
generally (for example, membership in church-related groups, labor
unions, the PTA, Boy Scouts, and fraternal organizations) has stead-
ily declined during the past several decades.21 Putnam defines the
term "social capital" as those features of social organization such as
networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and co-
operation for mutual benefit.216
The decline of social capital is particularly pertinent to the devel-
opment of family law. Research in a broad range of disciplines, in-
cluding education, urban poverty, unemployment, crime control,
drug use, and health, has revealed that successful outcomes are
more likely in civically engaged communities. 217 Putnam suggests
that networks of civic solidarity are pre-conditions for socioeco-
nomic development. This really is not such a novel discovery. In
the 1830s when Alexis de Tocqueville visited the United States, he
recognized civic association as the key to America's ability to make
democracy work.21 8
population was divorced. See id. These statistics suggest that although there has
been an increase in the incidence of divorce, marriage is still a desired status. In
fact, a recent article in Time Magazine suggests that about 75% of all divorced peo-
ple remarry. See Gleick, supra note 98, at 83.
213. If we begin to consider children "as they really are, . . . end points in evolu-
tion that lead us forward," REDFmLD, supra note 184, at 184, and we consider the
statistics concerning fatherless children, we might be persuaded to raise our aspira-
tions for marriage and the nuclear family. See, eg., Kandoian, supra note 23, at 524
("If the legal system is officially unaware of the thoughts and impulses motivating
the society and itself, it lends to rigidity, lack of contact with human concerns and
even irrationality.").
214. Putnam, supra note 25.
215. See id. at 68-69.
216. See id. at 67.
217. See id. at 66. Putnam discovered in a "quasi-experimental study of subna-
tional governments in different regions of Italy" that "the quality of governance was
determined by longstanding traditions of civic engagement (or its absence). Voter
turnout, newspaper readership, membership in choral societies and football clubs-
these were the hallmarks of a successful region." Id.
218. See id. at 65-66. Putnam quotes Tocqueville:
Americans of all ages, all stations in life, and all types of disposition are
forever forming associations. There are not only commercial and industrial
associations in which all take part, but others of a thousand different
types-religious, moral, serious, futile, very general and very limited, im-
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The title of Putnam's article-Bowling Alone-is suggestive of
the current behaviors of Americans. The title derives from statistics
that show that while the number of Americans bowling has steadily
increased, their membership in leagues has steadily declined3' 9
Putnam points out a curious countertrend: the growth of mass-
membership organizations.2 0 These organizations differ greatly
from those with declining membership. The vast majority of "mem-
bers" in the mass-membership organizations rarely attend meetings.
Their membership for the most part consists of paying dues and oc-
casionally reading a newsletter. 1 It appears that Americans still
have a hunger to belong, but not the time. Therefore, even their
associational connections consist of solitary, individual activity.
Likewise, Americans still seem to have a hunger for talk, as evident
in the proliferation of television and radio "talk shows." However,
similar to their solitary associational memberships, most Americans
now even "talk" alone.
Putnam points out that in some instances well-meaning public
policy has resulted in an unanticipated decline in social capital. He
points to examples of American slum clearance and consolidation of
country post offices and small school districts into larger, more effi-
cient administrative units.m'  Because the concept of social capital
was either forgotten or simply not considered a valuable ideal, it
played no role in the policy decisions.m23
C. Social Dialogue for Integration
The isolation discussed in Bowling Alone brings us full circle to
the efficiency-minded, process-driven development of divorce law.
Putnam's article demonstrates that unanticipated problems result
mensely large and very minute.... Nothing, in my view, deserves more
attention than the intellectual and moral associations in America.
Id.
219. See id. at 70. Although more Americans are bowling today than ever
before, bowling in organized leagues has decreased by 40%. Putnam notes that 80
million Americans bowled at least once during 1993, one third more than voted in
the 1994 congressional elections. See id. These statistics, although trivial with re-
spect to their subject matter, support the proposition that Americans are leading
progressively more insular lives.
220. See id. at 70-71. Examples include the Sierra Cub and the National Organi-
zation of Women (both of which have hundreds of thousands of dues-paying mem-
bers); and the American Association of Retired Persons, which grew from 400,000
members in 1960 to 33 million in 1993. See Id.
221. See id at 71.
222. Such actions are similar to the destroying of entire ecosystems by uncon-
sciously or thoughtlessly killing a particular organism in the chain without consider-
ing its purpose or value in an attempt to implement policy. Putnam points out an
example of law being used in its constitutive role: a recent proposal in San Luis
Obispo, California, would require all new houses to have front porches (thereby
encouraging social capital). See id. at 77.
223. See id.
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from narrow, one-sided views of the law, or of any other social con-
struct or issue. We must synthesize our ways of knowing.224 Public
policy in the form of law shaped by narrow ideology, such as eco-
nomic efficiency, may appear to solve problems; in fact, it masks
underlying issues and delays or impedes purposeful solutions. It is
not too late to turn back, but there is an urgent need for the commu-
nity to reach a consensus with regard to the values and ideals inte-
gral to family law.
We are all rushing, but where are we going? Without direction we
are sleepwalking. We must slow our lives down and remember the
important ideals upon which our society was formed. The family
remains the focal point of the structure of society, as weli as the
primary nurturer of our children-who "should be viewed [and val-
ued] ... as end points in evolution that lead us forward." ' Family
law, unlike any other branch of the law, has a far-ranging impact on
the forming of society, both present and future. We have the ability
to encourage or discourage social capita 2 6 and in turn to
strengthen or weaken our ability to come together to form law
which meets our highest aspirations.
224. Various scholars applying different models are beginning to discuss the need
for synthesis of ideas and ways of knowing. See, e.g., Carol J. Greenhouse, Construc-
tive Approaches to Law, Culture, and Identity, 28 L. & Soc'y REv. 1231 (1994) (an-
thropology and family law); Kabdoian, supra note 23, at 560-61 (psychology and
law). Kandoian observes:
Failure to consider the unconscious dimension of our collective life can fa-
cilitate those naive legal responses to a problem that ignore the society's
and the law's "shadow." It can permit an easy rallying around an appar-
ently rational solution to a problem and leave powerful unconscious forces
neglected and free to subvert the society. At present, few are satisfied that
our legal systems fully serve our collective best interests. As we move for-
ward in pursuit of responses to the great critiques of law in our time, we
would do well to remember that the relation of law to the human psyche is
a powerful one and that we cannot address one without addressing the
other.
Id at 560-61. Mary Ann Glendon notes a similar point:
At most, the preliminary analysis attempted here may suggest a useful way
to synthesize many seemingly unrelated phenomena, and serve, as a step in
the current process of reopening the conversation, that has too long lapsed,
between law and the other social sciences.
MARY ANN GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEw PROPERTY 8 (1981).
225. REDFIELD, supra note 184, at 184.
226. I believe Maine has an advantage with regard to the encouragement of so-
cial dialogue. My guess is that statistics on social involvement in Maine may not be
as discouraging as national averages suggest. "Mainiacs" have a tradition of commu-
nity involvement. As a family law practitioner in Maine, I found the community of
people involved with divorcing families particularly well-integrated. In fact, I be-
longed to an organization that is still active in southern Maine-Resources for Di-
vorced Families, made up of practitioners, mental health professionals, and
consumers, all involved in helping divorcing families. This bodes well for the further
development of social dialogue concerning the forming of family law in Maine.
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VI. CONCLUSION
"The future will depend on what we do in the present."
Ghandi
It is possible that between the lines Judge Sheldon and I are tell-
ing the same story. The stories, however, have different endings.
We both recognize the purposeless "sleepwalking" development of
current domestic relations law, and we both recognize the need to
consider the behaviors of society. It is at this point that our stories
diverge. Judge Sheldon, thinking that he takes the road "less trav-
eled," ' 7 suggests a process-driven, interpretive approach to the
problem that will create far-reaching and unimagined repercussions
in the future. I view Judge Sheldon's approach to Koestler's book,
and the attitude he presents in his article, as pessimistic and defeat-
ist. I choose a different road.
My aspirations for this Article are similar to the aspirations
Koestler expressed for his history of cosmology-to highlight and
view the current problems with divorce law as a story about separa-
tion and integration. And, like Koestler, I am hopeful that "a new
synthesis can [emerge] from apparently hopeless fragmentation."2 8
We can "derive some positive hints" from Koestler's book. 2 9 The
separation of various branches of knowledge and endeavor, and the
resulting isolated development of one-sided specializations and rigid
views, must be recognized and reconciled. I have attempted to point
out that our current emphasis on process in family law is resulting in
an interpretive approach to law that splits our ways of doing and our
ways of knowing. Like Koestler, I suggest that salvation lies in our
ability to reintegrate at all levels beginning with a reintegration of
social capital into our culture.
227. Robert Frost, The Road Not Taken, in AN INmODUCnON TO ROBERT
FROST 271 (Louis Untermeyer ed., 1951).
228. KoEsm..r, supra note 21, at 518.
229. See L
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